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Chapter I, Introductions The Trust Movement. 
The growth of Industrial combinations on a large 
and hitherto unprecedented scale in this country from 1898 
to 1902 has changed the conditions under which "big business 
is conducted and has given rise to problems,which have 
vexed economists and legislators. The results of this 
trust movement are just now becoming apparent,so recent is 
its origin. In fact,we are still in the midst of a great 
trend towards concentration,the ultimate outcome of 
which is a matter of conjecture. Consequently its signi-
ficance is variously interpreted. On the one hand, it is 
maintained that trusts are inefficient, and that they are 
agencies of exploitation, and depredation. If this view be 
taken,then the trust movement marks a backward step in 
our economic development and the sooner we return to com-
petitive production,the better. On the other hand,it is 
declared with equal ardor that trusts are efficient and 
that the age of trusts has come to stay. It will be the 
purpose of this discussion to examine the elements of 
strength and weakness in certain combinations and by a study 
of their origin,development and present methods of carrying 
on their business to determine whether or not they are 
efficient according to economic standards. That is,do 
-trusts lower the oost of production? Does the mere fact 
of combination eliminate industrial waste? 
The history of combination in the TJhited States 
naturally falls into two periods,the first beginning with 
•the close of the Civil War and lasting until the return of 
prosperity after the panic of 1893,the second covering 
•the last two decades. 
The Civil War brought about the necessity of 
la,rge scale production to supply the demands of a million 
soldiers. At Its close,all energies were directed towards 
industrial expansion. Many causes contributed to make the 
next period one of rapid progress,chief of which were 
tn@ development of railway systems and the opening of 
iron mines. 
In the beginning,competition was universal,even 
in the field of transportation. Monopoly of any form was 
regarded as prejudicial to the public interest. 
The first reason for concentration Is found in 
the grouping of the large manufacturing industries 
according to the exigencies of the market, (a) Because of 
the great distances between the centers of population 
in this country, the cost of transportation becomes a 
very important item in the final cost of production. The 
source of the raw material has determined the location of 
*as.ny industries,of which the products manufactured are 
(a) Heads, Trust Finance, p.8 
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of low value in proportion to their weight. Points thus 
conveniently situated with respect to natural resources 
become distributing centers for the finished products. 
At first, in each center there are usually two 
or more concerns engaged in producing the same article. 
Because of the limitation of available sites in locations 
that have a natural strategic advantage,the entrance of 
new companies into the field becomes exceedingly difficult 
once the original plants are well established. But the 
competition that sooner or later ensues between these 
latter is most intense. The final outcome will be the the 
survival of the best equipped,unless the possession of 
some special aid like a patented process enables the 
weaker to maintain itself. The tendency is thus for com-
petition in local centers to end in combination. 
Competition for a long time continues between 
the different industrial centers,but with the development 
of better transportation facilities,manufacturers widely 
separated by distance meet in a common market,and the 
competitive struggle is re-enacted on a larger scale, (a) 
There are severallcircumstances- which cause the 
competition thus engendered to bear with such severity 
upon the manufacturer that he usually turned to combinatiait. 
for relief. 
(a) Van Hise, Concentration and Control, p.5 
Til© n&tural effect of competition is to keep 
priees near the cost of production. But where large 
amounts of fixed capital are involved,price cutting does 
not stop at the cost of production, since it often requUofcs 
a greater sacrifice to allow an expensive plaint to lie idBe 
than to operate it at aloss. Capital cannot be withdrawn 
freely from a losing industry. In the event of over-
production, the re is no dsfinite price limit, below which a 
manufacturer will refuse to sell. He is led By M s own 
fears to make concessions to buyers without regard to the 
cost of production. 
The evils of competition are accentuated by the 
recurrence of panics and periods of industrial depression. 
Wide fluctuations in prices accompany the ups and downs of 
business. Under competitive conditions,supply dose not 
accurately adjust itself to demand. In industry is en-
couraged to over-build by the high prices of the era of 
prosperity. When a breakdown occurs the productive ca-
pacity of the existing plants is far in excess of that 
demanded by the market. This causes the abandonment of 
the poorest plants. After ths rebound from ths panic, 
the reduced output is insufficient for the increased 
needs of consumers and new factories are called into 
existence. The repetition of this process entails waste. 
The competitive system in its actual operation 
further tended to increase the losses of a panic and to 
lessen the profits that should vecompanse the producer for 
this added risk,"because Qf the prevalence of long-time con-
tracts. The hulk of the orders,made a year in advance of 
delivery,were hooked during periods of low prices, when 
keen competition among manufacturers forced prices down 
to an unprofitable level. 
The pool was the first form of combination. The 
early pools were organized to maintain profitable prices. 
Competition had proved to be the death of profits and 
combination was for self-preservation. Pools flourished 
In secret since they were illegal and their agreements 
unenforceable in a court at law. 
The pool is thus a voluntary association of 
sellers to control prises. The object of the pool Is 
accomplished eMttjrr by a prohibition of sales below the 
quotation mutually agreed^ty Its members. To make 
this effective a restriction of the output of all the 
plants of the association is generally required. Thus 
the sole aim of the pool is to secure united action In 
regard to prices. In discussing ths pool,it Is to be 
remembered that while characteristic of the first period 
of trust growth,it is still widsly in evidence. 
Ths pools in the cordage Industry were formed 
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in 1860. A. few years later tlie well-known MicMgan Salt 
Association came into existence. Beginning in 1860 the 
production of salt in Michigan developed rapidly. By 1865 
66 companies were in the field. Bitter competition soon 
commenced with the result that the weaker concerns were 
driven to the wall. Michigan was then the chief salt 
producing region and the business partook of the nature of 
a natural monopoly. Consequently the remedy for the evils 
of competition readily suggested itself. * After a period 
of individual agreements,a more permanent association con-
trolling four-fifths of all the salt shipped from the Sagi-
naw Valley was formed. This organization suspended 
operations in 1871 because of internal dissensions. Five 
years passed without a pool. Unrestricted competition a— 
gain forced down prices. At this Juncture a circular 
was sent to all the salt manufacturers by the head of a 
small salt association. This read in part: 
"The old adage, 'In union there is strength; is true 
wherever you apply it and in the manufacture of salt there 
is no exception. The Michigan Salt Association has been 
inactive. #### What has been the result? Salt has depre-
ciated in value and dropped steadily down until now it has 
no market price on the Saginaw River and is quoted at only 
$1.27 in Chicago and $1.00 in Toledo. # # # The oldest 
manufacturers of the Syracuse,Kanawha and Ohio districts 
tell us that their experience dating 40 years back in some 
cases has always been, 'Organized we have prospered,un-
organized we have not.'" (a) 
This brought forth the desired action. A meeting 
was held shortly afterwards at which a new association 
controlling 85 per cent: of the product was created. 
(a) Ripley, Trusts,Pools and Corporations, p.6 . 
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The pools organized in the steel industry intthe 
late eighties and early nineties show to "best advantage 
the defects of this form of combination. 
After trusts had been formed in the petroleum 
and sugar industries,there were repeated attempts at con-
solidation in the steel trade. These attempts took the 
form of loose associations,under which the individual 
concerns retained their identity and to a large extent 
their independence,at least complete independence in owner 
ship .Two deserve special mention, the steel rail pool and ti 
the wire nail pool. 
- TheGSteel-Rail pool began its career on august 2, 
1887 and lasted with a few lapses until 1897.The members fr 
of thepool agreed to limAttheir sales to the amounts allot 
ted to each by the central authority,cilled the Board of 
8ontrol. (a) The written agreement between the various 
parties was designed to provide a very effective control 
of the production off steel rails by members of the pool, 
who together manufactured at that time more than 90$ of t 
the country's output, (b) 
This association bad a most promising outlook,be-
cause all the largg manufacturers of steel rails belonged 
to it,and the requirements of large capital and extensive 
plant made the establishment of a competing concern g 
difficult. A further condition that favored its success 
was the fact that nearly all the purchases of steel rails 
(a) For the full agreemaj&t, see Appendix A 
(b) Bureau of Corporations on STBEl INDUSTRY,!i 71 
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were made at one seaaon ofi the year-a fact that contribute 
ed much to stability. 
Notwithstanding a reasonably effective organization 
the pool collapsed in 1893,on account of disagreements ove 
over allotments.lt was reorganized in 1894 but finally 
broke up in 1897.During the scramble that followed raiJBs 
were offered generally at $15 <a ton,although the nominal 
price before the break was $28. 
tThus the pool proved to be an unstable and pre-
carious method of combination.lt was easily disrupted by 
disagreements among its members. Any member could quit on 
short notics.The effect of even a few such withdrawals 
was always fatal to the success of the pool.Mutual distruAt 
made this weakness all the more disastrous. I^ was inabil-
ity to enforce agreements that ledtrto the downfall of the 
pool. 
In times of depression the management of a pool be 
came exceedingly troublesome .Then the strong members ex-
ert strong internal pressure to break away from the fix-
ed allotment.Dissolution was then hard to avoid.The follw 
lowingquotation from the Iron Age of December 16.̂ .896 afenw 
shows the usual fate of the pool$-
"The Billet Pool is now in session .The meeting pre-
mises to be a stormy onea-s there is considerable ill feel-
ing against certain concerns,who are charged with having 
violaaed the pool agreement,The pool was practically dis-
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solved as soon as the resignation of the Bellaire Steel 
Company was in the hands of the Secretary. There has been 
an open market on billets,sheet,and tin plate bars since 
Saturday and a scramble for business on the part of some 
mills. (a) 
The prices that followed the disruption of the 
pool were often much lower than those prevailing before 
combination was attempted. 
If,on the other hand,the pool attempted,, to force 
prices up,strong outside pressure was created. This is 
illustrated by the Wire-Nail Pool,which arbitrarily raised 
the base price of wire nails from $0.85 a keg to $£.55 in 
a single year. These high prices stimulated the invest-
ment of new capital in the field. Since $10,000 was 
sufficient to equip a new plant competition soon disrupted 
this association. 
There was need of a more permanent organization 
if the evils of competition were to be avoided. Pools 
did more nam than good to an industry in the long run. 
Competition instead of being prevented was stimulated by 
the high prices df the pools. Strong tendencies were 
thus at work within and without to dissolve them. More-
over they had no legal sanction. 
These difficulties were apparently removed by 
the "trustee" type of combination. This was a develop-
ment of the eighties. The Standard Oil Company,after se-
curing a monopoly of the business in 1879,formed a trust. 
This device was the model for many similar combinations 
during the following decade. 
The second and most important trust agreement 
entered into by the Standard interests was that of Jan.,2 
1882. It provided for a combination of the Standard Oil 
Company and affiliated groups .without a consolidated cor-
poration. The various properties were controlled by a board of 
(a) Quoted by Meade in his Trust Finance, p. £8. 
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trustees „to whom all shares wers irrevocably assigned,and 
hy whom "trust certificatesl* were issued to the former 
stockholders. That is,the stock of the various oil com-
panies was exchanged for certificates in trust. The trustees 
were to keep the securities of these concerns,as long as 
the "trust" continued,but they did nom acquire ownership 
of them,they merely held them in trust for all parties in 
interest jointly. It is important to note that if an in-
dividual owned before the organization of the trust a de-
finite share in a given oil company,he lost title to that 
particular share and acquired a proportionate interest in 
alll the property held by the trustees. The wording of the 
trust agreement indicates this: 
"Tnis is to certify that — o — is entitled to —share 
in the equity of the property held by the trustees of the 
Standard Oil trust,transferable only o& the books of said 
* 
trustees or on surrender of this certificate." (a) 
The holders of trust certificates received divi-
dends and voted on trustees in practically the same fashinK 
holders of certificates of a'voting trust do. The trustees 
controlled absolutely the policies of the numerous concern 
whose stock they held,since they appointed the board of 
directors for each of the constituent companies. 
(a)Bureau of Corporations,petroleum Industry,Part I :69 
. TMs seemed a well nigh perfect device for the 
restriction of competition. Accordingly the Sugar "trAst" 
and the Distiller's and Cattle-Feeder's"Trust" were organized 
in 1887 and plans were being made for a wider extension of 
the movement when it was cut short by a wave of hostile 
legislation,which terminated the career of the "trust11 form. 
Commencing with the Granger agitation of 1870,a 
deep-seated popular prejudice against any tendency towards 
monopoly began to express itself. By 1890, sixteen states 
had passed anti-trust acts. On July 2, of the same year 
the famous Sherman Anti-Trust'Act, whifeh declared that, 
"Every contract,combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several states, " was illegal,became a law. (a) 
The trustee form was particularly open to attack. 
Although pools were equally guilty under the law,the 
secrecy with which they were conducted practically gave 
them immunity. But the trust,the successor to the pool 
could not escape. Trust agreements were matters of recoad. 
Trustees could not deny the relationship that existed be-
tween them and the holders of trust certificates. The 
latter had at all times the right to inspect the books of 
the trust. Cosequently it could not exist contrary to 
law. Such plain and open restraint of trade was condemned 
even by the common law. (b) 
(a) See APPENDIX B. 
(b) Meade, Trust Finance, p.33. 
In 1890 the Attorney-General of Few Yb*rk "brought 
suit against the North River Sugar Refining Company under 
the common law.The case was decided against the company, 
not only on the ground,as the presiding judga stated,that 
the concern was a combination "the tendency of which is 
to prevent competition in its broad andt',general sense and 
to control, and thus at will to enhance ,,prices to the 
detriment of the public, but because the corporation 
* 
entering jjhe trust,had exceeded the powers of its charter." 
Simular proceedings were instituted against the Standard 
Oil Company in Ohio in 1892, with like result, (a) 
Thus the adverse decisions of the courts destroyed 
for the time beimg the legal basis of combination. rIT 
now became necessary to find some new device, or else re-
turn to the pool,which had proved impossible to maintain. 
The experience with pools and trusts had demon-
strated to their managers that besides the advantage of 
controlling the market and preventing many of the evils 
of falling prices,combination also made possible saving 
in cost of production.To what extend these so-called 
economies were real and to what extent they were offered 
as a justification for monopoly,which was naturally ab-
horrent to the popular mind,is difficult to determine. 
No doubt both elements had their part .At any rate the 
followin-g economies appealed strongly to trust managers 
and increased their eagerness to form combinations anew. 
(a)Meade,Trust Finance,p. 33. 
1.Saving in cross freights "by shipping from the near-
est factory of a combination. 
£. The advantage accruing to a merger due to selection 
of the best patented processes from those employed by the 
former competitors. 
3.The saving in running all plants at full capacity. 
4.Conservation of natural resources. A combination 
avoids extreme price fluctuations .which are conducive to 
wasteful production. 
5.Various other economies,such as saving in advertis-
ing,bad bills,traveling salesmen,advantage of buying in 
large quantities,utilization of by-products,etc.,some of 
which can be realized by any large business unit. 
Influenced partly by a desire to secure these 
economies,the combination interests discovered a new 
way to control trade, the holding company method. 
In 1889 the State of New Jersey enacted a law, 
amending its previous corporation act,by which it was 
made one of the proper objects of incorporation for a 
company to be organized to hold the stock of other com-
panies. This law had the most far-reaching consequences 
of any single piece of legislation enacted in the last 
half century. Tor the time,it nullified the stringent 
laws of sixteen states. 
Thus a corporation,chartered in the State of 
New Jersey for the sole purpose of holding the securities 
of two separate companies in another state and thereby 
preventing competition between them could not be attacked 
by legal process in that state. The foreign state had no 
jurisdiction over the New Jersey corporation,it could take 
no cognizance of the relationship that existed between it 
and its two subsidiaries. Here was a device that success-
fully evaded hostile state laws, 
-14-
Tlie holding company was still liable to the con-
demnation of the federal anti-trust act. However in the 
E.C. Knight case,brought before the Supreme Court of the 
United States under this law,it was decided that the Sher-
man Act applied only to interstate commerce and that 
"the fact that an article is manufactured for export in an 
other state does hot of itself make it an article of inter-
state commerce." (a) 
Thus by substituting the relation of owner and 
property for that of trustee and trust,a form of combination 
was devised that was safe from legal interference,for the 
immediate future at least. The spirit and letter of the 
anti-trust acts were more flagrantly violated by the new 
organization than by the pool or the trust, but technically 
the holding company was above reproach. With the last 
obstacle removed,the way was now clear for consolidation 
on a grand scale. 
The first period of trust history witnessed the 
evolution of the holding company from the pool. Several 
industrial combinations arose during this period. The 
Standard Oil Company attained monopolistic position in a 
single decade,1870-to 1879. The Whiskey Trust was formed 
in 1887. The American Sugar Refining Company,organized 
in 1887,controlled 92 per cent of the sugar industry in 
1892. The American Tobacco Company began its career in 1890, 
(a) 156U.S, 16, Meade, Trust Finance, p.42. 
Competition was the keynote of the thirty-two 
years from 1865 to 1897. Combinations ,with the promi-
nent exceptions already observed was short lived. (a) 
Pools had but a temporary existence.and Competition was 
bitter and unrestrained. Its very excesses forced men 
to form temporary alliances. So conspicuous was this, 
that even as late as 1900 the Industrial Commission con-
cluded thaf'of all causes leading up to combination,com-
petition so vigorous and so destructive that nearly all 
competing concerns were ruined,is to be given first place*,' 
In 1898 a new epoch was inaugerated. Within 
three years, 149 combinations with a total capitalization of 
$3,578,650,000 were promoted. Consolidation was attempted 
in such industries as coal mining,iron and steel,copper, 
lead,paper,gbe3£,leather,salt,s tarch,ice, glas s,cordage 
paving and tobacco. (b) 
The movement is essentially different from the 
tendency to sporadic and loose combination,so noticeable 
in the earlier period,in that it was largely directed by 
financial promoters. It had its beginnings in the sum-
mer of 1897. A large wheat crop increased the earnings 
of the Granger roads and started a "bull" movement on the 
market. Speculative buying commenced. The railroad se-
curities rapidly passed to investment standing and became 
unavailable for this purpose. 
(a) -Obinmissioner,Corporations,Steel Ind. I. p . 7 5 . 
(b) Luther Conant,in Am. Stat. Ass. March 1901. 
Meade, Trust Finance, p.£. 
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The securities of the industrial combinations fur-
nished the outlet for this demand. It was well known 
that the Standard Oil Company had paid 12% dividends during 
the panic. Trust prospectuses contained glowing accounts 
of the economies of combination. The investing public 
was led to expect impossible things and to believe that ê gery 
consolidation was a potential Standard Oil Company. 
The flotation of new enterprises was unduly stimu-
lated by the abnormal demand for their securities. Many 
of the "trusts" were mere stock-selling schemes,practically 
all were overcapitalized,some enormously. Says the 
Financial Review of 1900 in its retrospect of 1899; 
"The extreme industrial activity engendered a feeling of 
great confidence,very propitious to the creation and multi-
plication of new industrial enterprises.//// The result was 
the formation and flotation of industrial undertakings of 
enormous magnitude and in] unparalleled numbers. In every 
industry,in every line and branch of trade,great consoli-
dations and amalgamations were planned and in most cases 
carried into effect." (a) 
The part this feature played in the- late trust movement 
is thus described by Luther Conant,Commissioner of 
Corporations • 
"Indeed the proportions of the(consolidation)movement 
were largely determined by the opportunity to market the 
securities thus created. So long as the demand for such 
issues was maintained,the supply was steadily increased." (b) 
(a) Quoted by Meade, in his Trust Finance, p.7. 
(b) Commissioner of Corporations,Steel Industry, I. p.84 
Thus the tendency towards concentration was far 
from being merely an outgrowth of technical and industrial 
not 
considerations. It was ̂ altogether spontaneous l&edng ex- V*** 
panded by artificial causes. Marked reluctance on the part 
of some owners to sell out the businesses which they had 
built up,had to be overcome by a sufficient inducement and 
this inducement was the excessive price obtainable from the 
securities of combinations. In most cases profits depended 
on the issue and sale to the public of large amounts of 
"watered" stock. 
Only the unwillingness of the market to absorb 
further issues, checked the advance of the movement. The 
inevitable decline in values of industrial shares came,as 
the over-confidence subsided. There was a long and pain-
ful adjustment of stock market quotations to real valuation 
In this process ths holders of stock in these hasty and ill-
advised ventures suffered. Combinations like the Inter-
national Paper Company Rational Salt Company, Union Bag 
and Paper Company,American Ice Company and American Linseed 
Oil Company were cast from the stock exchange. Some went 
through the processsof liquidation. The great majority 
did not live up to the expectations of their promoters. 
The public soon safpvttsefally,when the fever of 
speculation had passed. The Northern Securities Case,in 
effect declared the holding company illegal,insofar as it 
applied to railroads. Several years later suits were 
instituted against the Standard Oil and American Tobacco 
Companies under the Sherman Law and the court declared 
them to be in restraint of trade and ordered their dis-
solution. 
At present conditions are, very unsettled. The 
efficacy of dissolution is a point of contention and in 
the mean time theie have been numerous suggestions in 
regard to the proper policy to be pursued in the treat-
ment of trusts. 
The combinations here presented have exercised 
monopolistic power in their respective fields and afford 
satisfactory evidence as to the efficiency of trust pro-
duction. 
C H A P T E R II. 
THE EFFICIENCY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY. 
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Chapter II. The Standard Oil Company. 
#1 
No trust has been so much before the public view-
as the Standard Oil Company. Ite officials have testified 
before Senate committees, and at several judicial hearings 
and its methods have been investigated and "exposed" by 
its former competitors,private agitators and governmental 
bodies through the medium of interviews, speeches,popular 
articles,court records and government reports. Familiar as 
its history is,its efficiency is partly a retrospective qu 
question,and one must repeat at the risk of irksomeness. 
The Standard Oil Company differs from the other 
trusts to be hereafter studied,in that it is a "growth" 
and no tea combination in the strict sense. "Combination" 
presumes the uniting of approximately equal factors. NO 
refinery ever entered asLalliance or joined thetrust,in 
the petroleum industry,save on terms prescribed by the 
Standard. 
The corporate history of this concern dates 
back to 1870 when the Standard Oil Company ofOhio was 
organized with a capital of $1,000,000,by John D.Rocke-
feller,William Rockefeller,Henry M. Flagler,Samuel 
fUidrew8,and Stephen V. Harkness.At the oufcs&t it occupied 
a very modest position,controlling not over 10% of the 
refining capacity of the country and owning no plants out-
side of Cleveland, the refining of petroleum was then a 
competitive industry,the capital invested in each refinery 
was smalland the number of refineries large,at least £00. 
Within less than a decade,in pursuit of the ambitious 
scheme of Rockefeller and his associatesnto carry on a 
"business of some magnitude and importance in place of the 
small business each had heretofor carried on",they had suc-
ceeded in getting control of (90^ of the refining capacity 
of the country, (a) 
It is not known exactly when the Standard became 
a monopolistic concern.In 1870,it began to expand by buying 
out small plants and by forming "alliances". John D. Rocke 
feller was the president of the Petroleum RefinerTs Assoc* 
ation of 1872.In a similar organization,later perfected̂ -̂ te 
the Standard interests had sufficent influence to cause 
themselves to be appointed sole selling and puchasing agen ts 
for the association.lt is probable that by 1875 strictly 
competitive conditions had ceased to obtain. 
Tlfeadominating position reached by the Rockefeller 
group in the seventies has since been rmaintained. .Analyzing 
the percentage of control over the total business in petro -
leum it?, is found that it has substantial monopoly 4-h the 
three intermediary stages,i.e. transportation of crude oil 
refining, and marketing of the finished product,while it 
is relatively unimportant in production of crude oil. 
The first stage is that of production of crude 
oil. until 1885,crude oil wells were limited to a large 
area,covering 50,000 sqaare miles,extending from Northern 
(a)Report of the Industrial Commission,vol.l,p.795 
quoted in Bureau of Corporations on Petroleum,I,P49. 
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Tenneeee to Southern New York,parallel to the Appalachian 
mountains .The oil from this, the "Appalachian!, fie Id is sur-
passed by none in quality.Although constituting a diminM 
shing percentage of the country Ts output of crude,because 
grade products(67^1 Humiliating oil,32% napthas,12.5$ 
lubricating oil,2$paraffin)it is still the mast important 
The Lima-Indiana field was discovered in 1886.It is 
only slightly inferior to \ the Appalachian in yield and in 
The Mid-Continent field embracing a considerable ter-
ritory in Southeastern Kansas and Oklahoma ,was first work 
ed on a large scale in 1904.The crude is similar to Lima-
Indiana, So far most of it has been stored. 
The Gulf and California fields bring up the total 
large producing areas to five, these last, while enormous-
ly productive ,give a very heavy,poor quality of oil. Very 
little of the product is refined,and consequently these 
fields may be ignored in a study of monopoly of finished 
product, (c) 
strength to possession of a limited natural resource is 
shown by the fact that in the Appalachian field it produced 
(a)Bureau of Corporations ,Petoleum Industry,! p. 100 ,108 
of the fact that it yields the largest proportion of high 
source of the oil,consumed by the refineries, (a) 
That the Standard Oil Company does not owe its 
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only 35.63$ of the crude oil in 1898 andits average was 
28.32$ for the nine years,1890-1898. Similar figures for 
the Lima-Indiana field were 35$ and 39.18$.(a) Absence 
of monopoly over the raw material is explained by two 
circumstances. First, it would nave caused even more bit-
ter public hostility against the Standard Oil Company than 
existed before,since control of a limited natural resource 
is regarded as especially obnoxious by many. 8econdly,4he 
more important consideration istthat because of the pecu-
liar speculative character of the oil business,it probably 
costs the Standard less on the whole to buy a large part £ 
of its crude oil from others than it would cost to produce 
the entire supply itself.(b) 
In the second stage,pipe line transportation^the 
trust has almost complete monopoly.lt has now a continuous 
"system of pipe lines from Oklahoma to the Atlantic sea-
board with a vast network of gathering pipes, reaching to 
practically every well in the -oil centers. This line was 
built at an original cost of $50,000,000 and it has since 
been extended.In percentages,the Standard oil Company cos 
trols 88.8$|of the pipe line capacity of the Appalachian 
field,where it meets the competition of thePure Oil Com-
pany and from 95-97$of the capacity in the Mid-Continent 
and Lima-Indiana field, (c) 
A close relationship exists between monopoly: over 
transportation agencies and the ownership of a large per-
"X&l Bureau of Corporations, Petroleum Industry,I p.114 
(b) Ibid. p.120 
(c) Ibid. p.139,145,146. 
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centage of the refining capacity of the country. Possessig 
the extraordinary advantage of pipe line monopoly the 
trust has not only heen .able to locate its refineries at 
strategic points,within convenient acess of larger markets 
so that the freight charges for shipping refined oil are 
reduced to the lowest possible sum,but it has been able 
to limit at will the amounts of crude secured by most rivals 
The Standard owns 23 large refineries. $hese con-
sume 84.2$ of the crude oil that is passed through refiner ^ 
while 75 independent plants consume only 15.8$. The Standard 
refinery atBayonne IT.J.,alone produces more than all the 
independents combined. The degree of control exercised by 
the trust varies from 67.2$ in the Gulf,?S.5$ in the Calif-
fornia,94.5$ inthe Lima-Indiana,98.9$ in the Colorado to 
99;l$in the Mid-Continent field. (Appalachian 80.5$) 
The last step in the process is marketing agencies 
It is important to note that the trust has almost entirely 
eliminated the middleman,selling directly to the retailer 
through its tank-wagon system of bulk delivery.In order to 
ascertain the extent of this control,the Bureau of Corpora 
tions sent out circular letters to 1 5,000 retail dealers, 
selected at random from trade lists. 5,397 dealers from 
3,854 towns-, answered. 4,829 of this number bought their 
Oil directly from the Standard or its affiliated concerns 
Counting purchases from jobbers,the percentage of dealers 
who reported purchases from the trast was 93.8$.Only 503 
dealersor 9.3$ traded with independents, (b) 
(a) Bureau of Corporations. Petroleum Industry I, p.289 
(b) Ibid p. 295 
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#2 
Even in the petroleum industry where one organi-
zation controls seven-eighths of the business,competition 
still has its influence. The condition is not that of 
monopoly in its absolute sense for the struggle between 
the trust and the independents is ever going on. The im-
portant fact is that where monopolistic position is the 
result of growth as in the case of the Standard Oil Co, 
the jjapid rise of one concern at the expense of others 
has been due to its possession of some competitive ad-
vantage over the field. All combinations are based on 
competitive advantage,but that does not necessarily mean 
that all have an inherent ability to sell the same goods 
cheaper than their rivals, be cause productive efficiency is 
but one of the competitive advantages. The methods used by 
trusts to attain control are partly the methods employed 
by every business organization to increase its sales. The 
extent t& which any concern is successful may depend on jar 
productive efficiency,that is, on favorable location of 
plants,the great ability of its managers and superior 
arrangement of machinery, or it may depend on advantages 
decidedly unfair in their nature,which tend to limit the 
activity of competitors by terrorism and byerecting 
artificial restraints about the market, which become espe-
cially opprobrious when monopoly is aimed at. 
—26— 
First,what methods resulted so Quickly in monopojyf 
The Standard Oil Company from its inception entered on the 
policy of acquiring refineries.Before 1877 it had also se-
cured possession of the local pipe lines. The idea of using 
pipes did not originate with the Standard,hut it was quick 
to realize their importance,once its competitors had put 
them in operation. It forced the Pennsylvania railroad 
to surrender the Empire Transportation Company in 18P7, 
and thereby gained the mastery of the local situation. 
These events however hut mark the outward results of secret 
forces. (a) 
In 1871 the South Improvement Company was organized 
in Pennsylvania,under an old charter,which conferred broad 
and convenient powers. The stockholders either were then o 
or shortly after became connected with the Standard. It was 
repreean&dd to certain railroads that this company was com 
posed of the leading oilrefiners of the country,although 
at the start it was an alter ego of the Standard Oil Com-
pany. At any rate,contracts were actually entered into be-
tween this concern and the Pennsylvania,Erie and Few York 
Central,providing for rebates amounting to 40 and 50% oil 
the gross rate on crude oil and 25-40$ of the gross rate 
on refined oil to be paid to the South Improvement Company 
on all shipments made, by it .What is even more extraordinary 
another clause of the contract stipulated that this concern 
should receive the same rebate on all shipments sent by 
(a) Bureau of Corporations petroleum industry, I p.53,60 
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out8ide parties. Further the South Improvement Company 
was to he furnished with a copy of the way bills of all 
would 
oil shipments ,which^ give it complete information as to the 
movements of competitors. There were other features,skill-
fully arranged so as to work to the secret advantage of th 
the combination. Thus Cleveland is referred to as adjacent 
to Titusville and is given the same rate for shipments. cat 
east,whereas in reality it is 150 miles due west of the oi 
oil regions jifl the vicinity of Titusville .practically all 
the Standard refineries were then located at Cleveland 3ra* 
itv;wasplaced on an equality with the oil centers by dis-
crinating rates, (a) 
No sooner was this contract made,than the Standard 
Oil interests used it as a club to frighten competitors 
into selling out to it. It is significant that 17 refineries 
were acquired by the Rockefeller group at this time, (b) 
These iniquitous provisions,however, aroused a 
storm of opposition,when rumor of their purport got abroad 
This hostility resulted in the charter of the South Im-
provement Company being annulled and its contracts abrogated.(c) 
The important features of this scheme were actually 
carried out,although apparently abandoned. Thus the growing 
combination secured enormous secret rebates during this 
period.The published rate from Western Pennsylvania to the 
seaboard was $1.40 a barrel for refined oil. The drawbacks 
and commissions allowed the Standard totaled 51.5 cents 
(a)~Bureau of Corporations,Petroleum Industry,I p.59 
(b) United States vs. Standard OIL Co., Brief vol.I,p.17 
(c) See Appendix 0. 
and thus the secret rate enjoyed by it was 88.5 cents. Tlie 
officers of the railroads did not deny that these rebates 
were paid,Cassatt of the Pennsylvania admitting itf pacLuenUy 
This practice continued as late as 1880. On every hand 
there were evidences of either open favoritism or mani-
pulation of classification tables,so that independents 
were heavily handicapped in their fight against the grow-
ing oil monopoly. (a)r, So pronounced were these instances 
that theBureau tff Gorporations concluded that it was due 
to these extraordinary favors that the Standard received, 
that it was able to eliminate competion in the seventies. 
"The railroad rebate,"says Herbert Knox Smith, "was the 
cornerstone of the Standard 0il Combination." (b) 
The laterrdevelopment of the Standard Oil Com-
T 
pany is characterized by the abuse of transportation agents 
and by price discrimination. 
These methods tend to discredit theStanda&dfts 
claim of superior efficiency, in the opinion of many. 
It would be nearer the truth to say that the illegal 
E pt&cticee detract from efficiency,as shown by profits 
since wrong-doing wjfttf&dxAet Biaftefc£fi$<ief#i6&ent JSBQC 
operation of plant or lessen superior ability. 
„ 
(a) Bureau of Corporations,Petroleum,I ,p 64. 
(b) Ibid, p £4. 
The railway re hater;, grievous as it was, would have 
been deprived of mugh of its force,had the rivals of the 
trust been able to hgea recourse to pipe lines for the 
transportation of crude oil,since then they could have re-
duced freight charges by locating their refineries at dis-
tributing centers. If the Standard Oil Companywould ac@e$$ 
the crude oil of independents for shipment and would trans -
port it for them without restriction and at a reasonable 
charge,they would not be handicapped in competition with 
the Combination. But the Standard has imposSd impossible 
conditions on the rendering of this service,thus practically 
refusing to act as common carrier,in defiance of both 
state and federal law, It has not only closed its own pipe 
to competitors,but it has crushed independents ,who tried 
to establish their own means of transportation. With the 
exception of aafew small lines,it enjoys exclusive use of 
•b$h local and trunk pipe lines,the possession of which 
are indispensible to the most efficient operation .The methods 
pursued to attain this end may be briefly summarized. 
One practice was to obtain complete or partial 
control of independent pipe lines by ptichasing their se-
curities. This enabled thefStandard Oil Company either to 
secure a majority interest or else a sufficient minority 
to insure a representative on the boa^d of directors.in this 
way it forced the TidewWater Company into virtual subjection 
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-tlie concern that first conceived and carried into effect 
a trunk pipe line from the oil fields of Pennsylvania to 
the seaboard. This project+was regarded as impossible by 
the trust,yet-tffeet the value of the new agency was demon-
strated by a rival,it employed unfair methods to c&pos-
sees it of the fruits of its superior forsight. The 
Standard attempted to gain conteol of the Pure Oil Company 
by this same process in the nineties,but it was baffled by 
the device of the voting trust, (a) 
Another unfair practice often resorted to by the 
Combination was to buy up land al6ng the route which the 
independent pipe line company intended to follow or to pur-
chase strips of land across such routes. In its oppositinn 
to the building of competing lines,it enlisted the support 
of the railroads,in denying a rival the right to cross under 
their tracks. Where pipe lines do not have the right of em-
inant domain,this proved to be an insurmountable obstacle. 
Thfs action compelled the Pure oil Company to abandon its 
attempt to reach Bar Harbor,to tear up its line,laid in 
New Jersey and to turn southward to Philadelphia. Again 
the Standard Oil Company was instrumental afltercitihadthe 
e&mflefced^iisr/owflceystem^&a securing the passage of laws 
refusing pipe lines,the power of eminant domain, (b) 
Atihird device to cripple the independent was to 
buy out the refineries,upon which it depended. Since? interest 
and depreciation charges are the principal:,items of erpenaa 
laT~Bureau of gorporations,petroleumIndustry,I p. 126 
-31-
in the operation of a pfcp'e line,aed any dimunition in the 
volume off oil carried,more than proportionately cuts into 
profits. 
Probably the most effective of all was the policy 
of the Standard to pay premiums of from 5 toEO cents a 
harirel to producers in the localities,reached by the inde-
pendent pipes.Because of the enormous volume of its business 
higher prices in a few places would not appreciably infSueifie 
tiitsaverage price,while such discrimination most oppressive \S 
restricted competitors, (a) 
Having acquired by such tactics as these,monopoly 
of the chief transportation medium,the gtandard Oil Company 
refuses to permim others to use it. 
Pipe lines had long before the passage of federal 
legislation been included inthe definition of common carrier 
according to the laws of several states,but the trust bad 
ignored their provisions. The first section of the Hepburn, 
act of June 1906 declared that all pipe lines,used for the 
transportation of oil were common carriers and as such sub" 
ject to all the provisions of the Interstate CommerceActt 
of 1887. This law requires filing of rates,publication of 
reports and it prohbits unreasonable charges, (b) The 
Standard has rendered it practically nugatory in the 
following ways. 
(a)Bureau of Corporations,Petroleum Industry,I.,p25 
(b) Ibid p.183 
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rirst,many of the pipe line companies controlled 
by the Standard Oil Company have altogether refused to 
file rates,alleging as their reason for not doing so,that 
they are operating wholly within the boundaries of a singP 
state. This is in part true as the Trust has reapportioned 
its pipe line property on a territorial basis,so that no 
subsidiary owns pipes outside of the state of^incorporatitfi. 
However,when it is considered that each" lineB form,the 
part of a continuous system controlled by a single organi-
zation and that arbitrary divisions at state lines were 
made after 1906 it becomes clear that the transaction was 
designed as at subterfuge to evade the law. 
Second,such of the Standard»s companies as filed 
tariffs,named rates that were altogether excessive. The 
Bureau found that they were practically the same as the 
rail charges,notwithstanding the fact that the cost of -J. e 
pipe line transportation of oil is not over ane^thirdl.of 
the cost of a similar service by rail. In fact, the Trust 
earns from 3 to 5 times a reasonable return on its pipe line 
Third,where a schedule of rates was published,it 
was to an obscure pumping station on statel line,where 
there were no facilities for receiving oil and where no 
one wanted it delivered. It is significant that no rates 
were specified to New York .^Harbor or Baltimore where the 
independents had refineries. .The reason is plain. Had it 
filed rates it would have been compelled t (to accept oil 
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for shipment at reasonable rates,which, it wasunwilling" to do. 
Fourth,the tariffs of the Standard'oil companies 
require shipments to be made in quantities of not less thaH" 
75,000 barrels and in the case of some lines,300,000 barrels 
is the minimum that will be accepted. Since that amount ex-
ceeds the annual capacity of most of the independent 
refineries,it is prohibitive. 
Thus the StandardOil Company,in the guise of com-
pliance,has proceeded in contempt of the Hepburn Act.The 
only defense it has offered to excuse its admitted violations 
of the law,is that the conditions of pipe line transportation 
are such that |t to handle any but-its own oil,is physically 
impossible. It makes the plea that the quality of the crucfe 
oil varies so greatly that it would be impracticable to 
mix the consignments and if this was done,injustice would 
be worked.The investigations of the Bureau and evidence in 
the dissolution proceedings against the Standard Oil Com-
pany ,proved that this contention was of no commercial im-
portance, it was shown that the crude oil of the same fi&cld 
was alike in quality,that no independdnt shipper would ex-
pect a small quantify of his oil to be kept separate from 
the common stock,that in fact it made little difference 
in shipments from the same field whether he received the 
precise stock consigned,or an equal amount of the average 
grade,and that large volumesof crudes of different quality 
could be sent through the same pipe,one after another,with 
no appreciable contamination of the better grade by the 
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poorer.and that therefore there could he no practical ob-
jection to the use of the pipe lines as common carriers.(a 
While the Combination has thus made itself inde-
pendent of the railroads in the transportation of crude 
oil,it has,until recently,continued to receive from them 
extraordinary favors in the shipping of its refined pro-
duct. It has habitually been the recipient not only of 
unjust discrimination in open' rates,but secret rebates as 
well. In 1904 the Bureau of Corporations uncovered hidden 
rates,which saved the Standard $750,000 yearly,and estimat 
ed that it was probably benefited as much more by discrimi-
nation in the open rates,such as lower rates from Whiting 
and other leading gtandard shipping points,than from 
large distributing centers in the immeadiate vicinity, (b) 
A few of these cases are.of especial importance in 
showing by what method,the trust controls the sale of dil, 
in certain territories, 
1. Northeastern New York and Vermont were,in 1904 
under the complete domination of the trust,because of the 
secret rates it enjoyed from its rifikeries at olean (N.Y) 
t© Rochester.The Pennsylvania railroad had given it a 
special rate of 7 cents a barrel,while independents adjacent 
to °01ean paid 38 cents for practically the same service. 
By a combination of secret rates the trust has been able 
to send its fca41< ln&vsYAxfeont at Speight cost of from 15 
to SI cents a 100 pounds,while its competitors were com-
pelled to pay 33 to 50 cents. This saved the Standard oil 
(a) Bureau of Corporation,Petroleum Industry, I,pl96 
U.S.vs.Stanford! .Brief for Petitioner,vol.1: 255-273 Cb\ nommissioner of Corp. ,TRansportation P. xxi 
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Company $115,000 during 1904 alone. Furthermore all the 
shipments from Olean on these secret rates were blind-
hilled, that is,the rates were not shown on the waybills, (a) 
2.The Standard Oil Company ,until 1904,kept up 
absolute control of most of the territory south of the 
Ohio River and east of the Mississippi by means of secret 
rates and open discriminations from WhitJng,Ind. The; pub-
lished rate from Whiting to Birmingham,Ala. was 44 cents 
per 100 lbs. For at least ten years,the trust,by means of 
a secret combination of rates by way of Grand Junction, 
Tenn.,over the lines of the Chicago and Eastern Illinois 
the Illinois Central,and the Southern Railway,has shipped 
oil to Birmingham for 29.5 cents. The Toledo competitor,no 
farther distant,had to pay 47.5 cents, (b) The saving affected 
in this way amounted to $70,000,per Lyear. Besides,the 
Standard was granted a so-called State rate of 66- 8 cents 
from Whiting to Evansvilie,Ind,Whenb(jkei o&fen, ̂ a^^alB llv:cents. 
i-3.Another notorious secret rate wasAfrom Whiting 
to East Sf.Louis,a distributing point for oil destined for 
the Southeast. The Standard was favored with a secret rate 
of6-6,25cents,when the published tariff was 18 cents.This 
arrangement was worth$240,000 annually. 
4.Finally,rebates in California have, benefited the 
Combination by at least $100,000 a year. 
Thus,it is evident,that the Standard Oil Company 
up to 1904 possessed an enormous unfair advantage over 
competitors,in the form of secret rates,which enabled it 
to exclude them from many markets. 
(a)Commissioner of Corporations,REPORT on Transportation of 
Petroleum, p.xxiii. 
Ch) Tbid cuoted from same, J.R, Garfield. 1906 
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Of all the unfair practices of the Standard Oil 
Company,that of cutting prices in localities,where competi 
tion prevails^ coupled with the enhancement of prices of 
the same quality of refined oil in the no-competition areas, 
is the most frequently complained of.Price discrimination 
is a/question of marketing methods. The Trust not only re-
fines,hut markets the largest percentage of its oil,sell-
ing directly to the retail dealer. For this purpose,it 
owns tank cars,tank wagons for local delivery,and tank 
steamers for the shipment of oil to foreign countries. Con 
sequently prices paid for kerosene,gasoline,etc.,in the 
various districts of the country are practically all local 
prices,i.e.,they hear no relation to the range of prices 
in the central markets.If prices are excessive in a given 
town,the store keeper has no way of taking advantage of 
lower prices elsewhere,because he would have to order the 
oil to be shipped in barrels,sndc*he cost of transporting 
oil in barrels, being much higher than the cost of tank 
car shipment would consume the gain in price of oil.More-
over the Standard controls 85$ of all the i oileltBfnfess^ne 
leaving only 15$ for its competitors. Even if this fifteen 
per cent was ih the hands of one. concern,it could not main 
tain the extensive marketing System of the Trust. But as 
it is divided among a great many small companies,the 
business of each is necessarily confined to limited secto 
The Standard 0̂ .1 Company restricts tfe&rfield even more 
by price discrimination.(a) 
(a) Commissioner of CorpoationsPetroleum Industry II.P433 
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That the Siandard Oil Company makes remarkable 
differences in the prices it charges for oil in the dif-
ferent towns and sections of the United States and that 
the sole cause of most of the conspicuous variations is 
differences in the degree of competition,is clearly shown 
by the price statistics of the Standard itself r̂rd intro-
duced inevidence by the Government in its recent suit. 
The records kept by the Combination*s statistical depart-
ment also exhibit the>profits per gallon on all refined 
oil iolih&n the large marketing territories into which th 
i&eha8 divided the couatry.and the margin ofprofit of the 
marketing companies upon the prices in each town in the 
smaller malrkSiigg divisions. Furthermore the records of 
the same department show the approximate amount of business 
done by the competitors of the Trust in certain cities ad 
and sections of the United States, (a) 
Taking first the large areas,composed of a groups 
ofstates or large parts of states,a wide disparity in 
prices and profits based on prices is at once evident. In 
1899 the rate of profit ranged from 0.58 cents a gallon t 
in the Eastern Pennsylvania division,where there was 18.7 
of competition,to $,36 in the Rocky Mountain States,where 
there was only 0.2$ of competition,Afcain,the average profit 
in the Pittsburg territory was0.66 cents,while on the Pacific 
Coast it was 2.86 cents,due to a difference in degree of 
competition from 5.7 to 15.8$. in 1906 the variations we* 
less marked,yet profits ranged from o.84 to 5.06 cents, 
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Averages for large areas,ley no means show the full 
extent of price discrimination.In many sections in each 
division the prices are high,in other sections of the 
same divisioh,very low,awMdhus the average results would 
not indicate.For example,there is the Waters-Pierce Oil 
company,a marketing agency of the Standard,whose territory 
corresponds to one of its larger divisions,covering South 
eastern United States and Mexico.In 1896 during a period 
of severe competition in r,St,Louis,this concern lost 1.3 
cents on every gallon sold there, while 'it made a profit 
of 2 cents in its North Texas division. Inl904 the range 
between the same localities was firSmcents to 4.4 cents.($u 
The extraordinary differences in prices due to 
different percentages of competition can be more force-
ably 8hown,if one compares the prices charged in towns 
in the same state. For instance,in Springfield,Massachu-
setts,where there was 21.7$ of competition in October 
1904,water-whitejoil was sold at 8 cents a gallon at a 
loss of 0.88 cent,while in other towns nearby like Brock-
ton,Fall River and Lowell,where there was either no com-
petition or very little,the price was 10.5 and 11 cents 
a gallon,with a margin of profit of from 172 to 2.18 cenfe 
In New York; state,the price at Binghamton ,where the 
Standard encountered 39.1$ of competition,the priceof oil 
was 9.5 cents a gallon and the profit 1 cent,but in New 
York city,oil sold at 10.98 cents at a profit of 2,31 cents 
(a)Bureau of Corpiratione, petroleum, Partll,p. 440 
-39-
probably because only 8.6 $ of competition prevailed .thet? 
In Pennsylvania,like variations occur, At Chester the 
Standard charged 8.5 cents for oil to meet 2o.9*f of com-
petition,but in Altoona the price was 13|centsaand the prpfit 
2.98 cents a gallon,the Trust having no competitor there. 
In the state of Ohio in 1964 the Columbus price was9,5 
cents,with only 2,3^ of competition,but in Cincinnati,in-
dependents had 45.3$ of the trade,and the Standard cut t&e 
price to 7 cents a gallon,representing a loss to itself ft 
of 1.09 cents. In the Middle West,at Duluth,the Trust sold 
• i 
its illuminating oil for 8.5 cents at a loss of 0.88 cent 
to meet competition,while at Mankato,where there was no 
competition,the price was 11.5 cents and the margin of 
profit 2.24 cents a gallon. The widest disparity exists & 
in the Western States. In Albuquerque,Few Mexico,oil was 
sold by the Combination for 23 cents a gallon,yielding it 
a profit of 6.48 cents. The difference between this and 
the Cincinatti price was no less than 16 cents a gallon. 
Most striking of all was the situation in California.A"fc 
Los Angelas,where there was 33.4$ of competition,the 
price was 7.5 cents a gallon,resuiting in a loss of 3.16 
cents.At Sacramento,the Standard had complete monopoly 
and fixed the price at 13 cents,earning 2.45 cents a gallon 
Likewise competition was entirely absent at Seattle,Port-
land and Tacoma^and the price was 15 cents,allowing a 
margin of profits of 4 cents a gallon, (a) 
(a) U,8, Vs. StJHQ&ttg.Brief of Pacts for Petitionerll: 8-12 See Appendix. 
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REFINED OIL—LOW MARGINS AND PRICES AND HIGH MAR-
GINS AND PRICES IN THE. SAME MARKETING DIVISIONS. 
Prices Corresponding 
Lowest .Highest Lowest Highest 
Name Margins Margins Margins Margins 
Albuquerque 0.26 7.12 14.00 23.00 
Baltimore 0.09 2.11 88 £80 1 1 ; 00 
Birmington 1.56 3.76 13.50 14.50 
Cincinnati • -1.09 1.86 7.00 11.00 Cleveland - .16 2.48 7.00 lo • 50 
Dayton - .31 1.05 7.50 9.00 
Davenport . .04 1.54 10.00 11.50 
Decatur .08 1.98 9.50 11.00 
Detroit .84 2.53 8.50 11 .50 
Duluth -.88 3 > 23 8.50 13.00 
Dubuque -.19 2.85 lo.OO 13.00 
Joliet -.48 1.80 8.00 1 1 . 0 0 
K. C. .23 2.66 10.00 13.00 
Los Angelos--3,40 -.54 7.50 10.50 
Louisville -.38 2.10 9.50 13.50 Memphis 
Minneapolis 
.18 2.78 10.50 14.00 
.£4 2.58 9.50 13.60 
Nashville .73 3.24 12.00 14.00 
New Orleans--1.35 2.46 9.50 12.50 
Peoria * is* 5 5 2.19 9.50 1 1 . 0 0 
Richmond -.27 £ • 85 8.00 12.00 
Sioux City .35 2 . 7 7 12.00 15.00 
Springfield -.88 1.29 8.00 10.00 
Wichita • 4o 3.57 11.00 15.00 
Wilmington. .62 2.79 11.00 14.00 
The Bureau of Corporations has collected a mass of 
data to prove that these differences in prices are also 
due to differences in the degree of competition. 
(a) Brief of Facts for the Petitioner,U.S.vStandard. 
II: 14-15 
These foregoing statistics for the different 
towns exhibit the prices charged at main stations.But maiF 
of the cities are the headquarters for substations in the 
immediate vicinity.If one consults the following table, 
extraordinary differences in prices will be found in the 
same general locality: 
(a) 
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"g?±aae. of oil,not only reflect the activity of 
the Standard's competitors in many towns at a given date, 
hut the direction of their movement is also determined by 
variations in the amount of competition. Thus,in January 
1902 the Trust sold oil at Atlanta andHew Orleans at the 
same price—lo cents.By October the price at Atlanta had 
risen to 11.5 cents ahd^that at Few Orleans had fallen to 
8 cents. The margin at the latter place had declined un-
fr&m a profit of 1,69 cents to a loss of 0,19 cent a gallm 
,while at Atlanta,profits increased from o.8? to 1.93 cents 
During the year,the independents secured at one time,34$ 
of the oil business at New Orleans,and the Standard waged 
a bitter conflict against them,but at Atlanta,no competitffln 
existed, (a) 
Besides cutting prices below its own cost of 
production,in districts where it encounters important op-
position, the Standard Oil Company makes special,secret en 
concessions to the customer's of independent concerns,in 
order to get their trade. To accomplish this purpose,it 
organizes bogus independent companies.These are marketing 
agencies,with no formal organization,generally in charge 
of a tank wagon driver,who is insiructedtto follow the 
wagonsoof independents and offer to sell their patrons oi 
oil at reduced prices.If necessary a second peddler's out 
fiii. is installed by the Standard,which also poses as an 
independent ,while under orders to \SzelirToM atiijany/price 
(a) Brief of Facts,TJ.S. v. Standard 11:18 
to get the trade of competitors. Scores of cases might he 
cited where independents were driven out by these methods. 
As soon as competition was killed,the bogus companies, 
ceased to operate or were removed to other fields,and 
prices were raised to their old level. In the meantime 
the Standard could maintain its prices to its "regular^ 
customers,through the ordinary delivery system.Thus it 
was able to wage competitive warfare of the most pre-
datory kind without involving its own business and with-
out reducing the prices on the larger part of the product 
Parely was this practice successfully combated by its 
rivals. Sometimes independents persuaded dealers to buy 
oil of them,by holding out as inducement that if they did 
so,a driver of the bogus company would .idsmaadiately visit 
them and sell them oil at extremely low rates, (b) 
In spite of the prevalence of unusually low 
prices in limited localities,where competition is active 
the average price level fixed by the Trust in this coun-
try is much higher than that of foreign nations,where the 
Trust markets one-half of its refined oil. 
This fact is important in explanation of the 
increase in the foreign trade of the Standard,so often 
put forward as an argument for its efficiency. 
The Few York export price for oil,fixed from 
day to day by the Standard Oil Company,has for many years 
(a)U.S. v Standard, Brief for Petitioner II,pp.21-586. 
(b) Ibid P 143 
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been materially less than the average domestic price. 
In 1898 oil for export was quoted at 3.8cents a gallon, 
when the price for home consumption was 7.5 cents. In 
1903,the averages were respectively 5.9 and 10.9 cents. 
To arrive at a more exact has is of comparison, 
the agents of the Bureau of Corporations visited many 
towns abroad,where the prices paid by retail dealers for 
oil delivered by tank wagon were secured. In contrasting 
domestic with foreign prices,it is necessary to allow I 
cent a gallon for the difference in quality between the 
"water-white" oil sold in the united STates and the 
"standard-white oil" sold abroad.This is a fair measure 
of the superiority of the former grade, according td the 
Combination's own estimate. After making the deduction,it 
is found that the American price was 2 cents a gallon Mfe 
higher than the Geroan price for the period,June to August 
1903,2.£ cents higher than the Bn&ish price,and 2,8 cents 
a gallon higher than the Standard's price in the Orient 
for ahe same time, (a) 
In justification of the discrimination against 
the American consumer,the defender's of the Oil Company 
maintain that there was an over-supply of crude oil in th 
United States in 1904,which necessitated th® sale of the 
surplus abroad at low prices.Investigation shows this to 
be untrue.In fact, the Standard made large purchases of 
crude oil in Russia and built refineries in Roumania to 
supply its export trade in 1904, It is apparent that 
(a)Commissioner of Corporations,REPORT.Petroleum II.-p.2o 
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"tiEBCfc the Standard is not actuated "by any desire to fur-
ther American commercial interests apart from the exten-
sion of its monopolistic position, (a) 
The sale of lubricating oil to the railroads 
"by the Galena Signal Oil Company,a subsidiary of the 
Standard,is characterized by discrimination "between dif-
ferent lines. This constitutes the third and last case of 
price discrimination. 
The Galena Company controls 95$ of the sales 
of lubricants.The Bureau of Corporations discovered 94. 
railroads,that were each under separate contract with i t . 
These contracts are alike i n ome^particular.The invoice 
prices(48^ a gallon for, valve oil,etc}- are the same for 
all the roads.But a clause i n every contract guarantees 
that the cost to the railroads shall not exceed a certain 
sum per ton mile.The reduction from invoice prices,allow 
ed by the guaranty clauses,varies from 51$ i n the case 
of the Pennsylvania to 3,2$ for 17 roads.41 paid the full 
price. The most remarkable thing about the arrangement i s 
that the railroads have refused to receive bids from inde 
pendents.The Norfolk and Western was offered lubricants A 
of .the b e s t quality,at half the prices charged by t h e ©ailena 
b y - a competitor,but i t voluntarily paid the higher rate. 
The Bureau estimates that the railroads of the country 
Pay$g£po,000 a year for their lubricants,more than the 
independents would sell the same oil for. 7fp) 
(a) fiommissioner of Corporations, On petroleum,$i :429 
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#3 Frofits. 
The unfair competitive methods.enumerated in the 
proceeding section,by no means exhaust the list. The Stand-
Oil Company has manipulated the public inspection of 
illuminating oil,so that the oil of its rivals has been ex-
cluded from the market,it has maintained an elaborate sys-
tem of espionage on its competitors,by bribing the employes 
of railroads to- furnish it with information concerning the 
destination oftheir shipments and it has not scrupled to 
practice petty fraud and deception,when such action would 
cripple a. competitor.A consideration of these acts,from the 
lesser evils,jus^ mentioned,to the long-continued wrong-
doing of greater magnitude;to abuse of the quasi-public 
(to the enormous railway rebates,) 
function of pipe lines ,£0 the world-wide policy of price 
discrimination,with which the history of the Combination is 
**_replete,and which tend to fortify and strengthen each 
other,so that taken in the aggregate they constitute one 
overwhelming unfair advantage,leads one irresistably to 
the conclusion,that it was through, their instrumentality 
and not through superior efficiency,that the Standard Oil 
Company outstripped its competitors and gained monopoly. 
It becomes further apparent that the illegitimate practices 
that enabled the Standard to direct a compaign against its 
rivals,so effectively that their pperations were confined 
to narrow limits,if they themselves were not destroyed, con 
each contributed to its profits,so that the immensity of 
its total earnings is not a measure of its efficiency. 
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It is a mistake.however ,to judge the efficiency 
of the Trust entirely fey the methods it has pursued in the 
past or even fey its present conduct and to ignore the result© 
These results express themselves in terms of profits. The 
ability to earn large profits is said to he the conclusive 
criterion of efficiency.(a) This is true in general under 
strictly competitive regime. When a concern acquires some 
monopolistic power,hut not complete monopoly,as is the case 
with the Standard,one must modify this statement and concede 
that the largest company in the field could add to its 
legitimate profits,derived from superior competency, an 
extra amount due to power to enhance prices. The:'question 
thefeeedeiided &£ tkhtfpercentage of the Standard's profits 
is dhe result of efficiency,and what percentage is due to 
rebates from railroads,pipe line abuses and price discrimi -
nation.The proper procedure is to determine,first the tots, 
profits and Second to find what amount is attributable to 
differenceesin cost of production between the Trust and the 
independents. 
Data as to the StandardSs profits are incomplete 
since the Company itself has published no reports of its 
business,other than its rate of dividends. Statistics ob-
tained in a lawsuit ̂some years ago disclosed the profits fo r 
the period,1882-1897. The rate varied from 10.3$ on the 
tangible investment in 1884#t© 83.1% jLin-1896,yielding a 
total profit of $244,026,000. for the whole time.^ 
(a) Schnacke, Thesis ,1912. The Sherman law TJ. Of Kansas, 
(b) Commissioner of Corporations, Petroleum,!! p.527 
These profits were completely overshadowed "by 
those of the period 1897-1906,when $387,434,444 was paid 
in dividends at a rate,varying from 30 to 48 per cent. The 
surplus in excess of profits for the 3 years,1903-1905 ate 
known to "be $82,000,000 in round numbers,and making a guess 
at the corresponding figures for the 6years,1897-1902 and 
1906,the combined total jktvti6ndandndis$#sids fiver dividends 
would probably amount to at least $790,000,000. 
This huge profit has been earned on an investment 
originally valued at less than $75,000,000.While the Standard 
has spent large sums on impovements sinee,it was able to do 
so only because of unusual earnings in the past,Even m the 
basis of a property valuation of $260,000,000 it has made 
25^ in its: ̂atestment in the past few years .When it is con-
sidered that much the larger part of its profits come from 
its domestic business,which constitute only/ one-half of its 
total bu8ines8,it is readily percMved that the rate of profit 
in this country has greatly exceeded that percentage. 
Profits of the Trust's subsidiaries confirm the 
conclusion that its average earnings have been exorbitant. (a) 
Thus the Waters-Pierce showed a rate of profit of 47.2^ in 19f<ft. 
Furthermore the Bureau of Corporations estimated 
that the average rate of profit of the Standard's refineries 
was 42$ or 2.4 cents a gallon on refined oil. (b) 
To the profit per!galioniatrthe refineries 
should be addedthe profit of the pipe lines,which would bring 
up the Standard's average profit to 3 cents a gallon. 
(a) Commissioner,Corp. Report on.Petroleum Ind. II p.535 
(b) Ibid ,p.594 
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'•'TMerepepeesentativee of the Standard oil Company 
attribute these great and increasing profits to itf-superior 
efficiency alone.They assert,in addition that the results of 
monopoly have been most beneficial to the consumer,in that 
the margin between the price of crude oil and its finished 
products has been steadily reduced by improved processes in-
troduced by the trust,which would imply that &he advantage:,cmer 
its competitors due to its unique ability is astonishingly 
great.This involves the assumption that it is not only more 
efficient than the present independents,but also more efficient 
than any concern,which could have developed had the field been 
unrestricted. (a) 
A comparison of the cost of production between the 
Standard and its competitors,now in existence,favors the Trust 
largely because of the lower cost,per unit,of operating an 
extended pipe line system. The Pure Oil Company,the Standard 
chief rival in the pipe line business,expends about 80 a bane 1 (4£g)' 
fir the local collection of its crude oil,while the operating 
cost to the Standard does not exceed 50 a barrel. The smaller 
concern,furthermore,requires a larger investment per unit of 
product than the Trust. The Pure Oil Company must receive 1$0 
a barrel in order to pay a depreciation allowance of 5% and 
10% profit on the investment in its gathering pipes,while 50/ 
a barrel will cover a similar charge for'the Standard. •Thus 
in the cost of conveying the oil from the wells to the maini. 
pipes,the Combination has an advantage of 13/ a barrel over 
its most efficient competitor, (b) 
a)Commissioner,Corporations,Petroleum Ind. II. p.614. 
b) Ibid , p.645. 
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In like manner,the Standard trunk lines transport 
crude oil from Western Pennsylvania to the seaboard at an 
operating cost of 3.32/ a barrel,in comparison with the Pure 
Oil Company's cost of 7.33/,for an equal service. Interest ad 
and depreciation charges are 15.5/ a barrel less on the main 
line Of the Standard than on that of t£e independent. The 
total difference in crude oil transportation ieoSi/is 31/ a 
barrel or 3/4 / a gallon in favor of the Trust. (a) 
The Standard refineries are operated at practicaly 
the same cost as the nine most important independent refineries 
selected by the Bureau for the purpose of comparison. Thus the 
Lima plant,the most typical of all the former's refineries 
refines crudeoil at acost of 89.29/ a barrel of 42 gallons. 
The average of the independents is "29.25/ a barrel,calmestt-
ide^iealii Wrence. 
The difference between the Standard and the inde-
pendents in the cost of marketing their products is very slight. 
The independents ,where*err they do ope rate, use the tank wagon 
method of delivery. In six cities the costs for "the service*t> 
the independents ware :0.88/,l/,l,42/,1.50/,l.57/,and 1.66/ a 
gallon.The Standard paid the following in different cities, 
Chicago,0.95/ a gallonjSt.Louis,1.22/;Richmond, 1.32/$ San 
Francisco,1.89/;*Los Angelos,1.3o/ and Denver 2.35/. This re-
veals little advantage to the Trust, (c) 
(a) Commissioner of Corporations,Petroleum Ind. II, p.648 
(b) IMd, p. 653. 
(c) Ibid, p.660. 
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One cent a gallon represents the amount of profit 
obtained by the Standard by reason of conducting its system 
at lower cost than its rivals. Since/its total profits are 
three cents a gallon, two cents may be reckoned as attributab . 
to g4$n§radcrnl^g!fr6&c%e enhancement of prices.The power to 
raise prices was derived from predatory tactics and hence in 
the last analysis,this sum is a tribute, to monopoly. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the facts,in 
regard to increase in prices,it is necessary to consider the 
sources of economy. 
The most conspicuous saving affected by the Trust 
is in the field of transportation^abusiness,which ©Saaokglgron-
ducted at its maximumadvantage only by a monopoly. A concern 
handling the main bulk of the crude oil in a territory can lgc 
lay large pipes -i.e. 6 or 8 inches in diameter- and keep tkm 
running at full capacity.An 8-inch pipe carries five times as 
much oil as a 4-inch pipe,the friction in the larger pipe is 
less than in the smaller,and the operating expenses are very 
little more.There is no doubt that the full economy of opera-
tion of pipe lines can be obtained only by monopoly. 
A further saving results from the very nature of 
oil pro duct ion. When a new field is discovered, the first wells 
are the most productive.In order to prevent the oil from be-
ing drained from their lands,men occupying ground adjacent to 
these,must drill also.Thus the output suddenly becomes very 
great.This requires speedy extension of pipe lines and the 
forwarding of large storage tanks or otherwise there will be 
waste. Only a concern,having the proportions of a monopoly 
can afford to possessbfacilities for undertaking this work, (a 
Again,some of the minor products of petroleum are 
desired 6nly in small quantities. The independents extract 
such proportion ofthese from the crude oil,as they can find a 
market for.But the Standard can sell all that it pays to take 
out of the crude. 
Finally,the Standard Oil Company is able to piiisfe 
research work and to maintain laboratories for the discovery' 
of new by-pro ducts, a surprisingly large number of which have 
been found. 
The Trust,however,has shared,none of these advan-
tages with the consumer in the form of lower prices,but it 
has instead been responsible for the high level of petroleum 
prices in recent years. AS Herbert Knox Smith,ex-Commissioner 
of Corporations said in his report,"It was shown that,so far 
from having reduced prices by reason of its superior efficiency 
the Standard Oil Company,at least during recent years,has 
greatly increased the margin between the price of crude oil 
and the price of its finished products in.its domestic trade 
and that this increase has been the chief source of addition 
to its profits during the same period." (a) 
This conclusion is substantiated by^at marked in-
crease between the price of Pennsylvania crude and the rela-
tive average price of its principal products from 1898 to 1903 
of 1.9 cents a gallon—an increase 4&M£*Ahtr&att& $fi hsn&owith 
a vast increase in the profits of the Standard Oil Company, 
(a) Commissioner of Corporations,Report,Petroleum. II p.614 
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The cost of production of the Standard Oil Company 
heing one cent a gallon lower than that of the present inde-
pendents, it is clear that it has an undeniable advantage,but 
it is equally evident that this is almost entirely due to ex-
clusive possession by it of the means of transportation of 
crude oil. Such an advantage itself is an illegal one,because 
pipe lines used for the canveyghce of oil have been common 
carriers since 1906 and the Standard in appropriating for it-
self the use of this quasi-public agency, is everyday violat-
ing the Interstate Commerce Act. The slight superiority of this 
Standard in other branches -would entirely disappear,if its 
competitors had a fair opportunity to become strong and 
efficient. But the Trust having obtained the bulk of the trade 
by railway rebates,has maintained its dominating position by 
price discrimination,soi that;'a .competitor:cannot enter a new 
town,where prices are fixed unduly high,wthout inviting a 
disastrous conflict. The oppressive influence,thus exercised, 
is nothing else but that unlawful restraint of trade,which it 
is the purpose of the Anti-Trust Act to condemn. To assist in 
applying the prohibitions of the Act,"restraint of Trade", 
should be more definitely defined so as to include,, selling 
below cost in one community for the purpose of driving out 
competitionfactor's agreementsjand other unfair methods used 
to intimidate competitors should be specifically described. 
Dissolution,as a remedy for the evils of tha.i^ust, 
has practically failed,because it attempted to separate it 
into mythical companies, in stead of into its natural branches. 
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Tlie proper enforcement of the Interstate Commerce 
Act,requiring the Standard to charge reasonable rates far 
pipe line services,would he a step in the right direction. 
If necessary the business of transportation could be separat 
ed from that of refining and marketing. If She Standarditas 
permitted to perform a dual function,iand'-notobeingoMldoto 
strict accountibility,tt ^proceeded tool make a natural mono-
poly the basis of a predatory industrial combination. 
C H A P T E R I H . 
THE EFFICIENCY OF THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, 
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(a) Bureau of Corporations,Tobacco Industry, I. p.2 
Chapter III. The American Tobacco Company. 
#1 
Combination in the tobacco industry began in 
189$ when the five leading manufacturers of cigarettes in 
the Unitedr>States,Allen& Ginter,W. Duke,Sons & Co. S.Xim 
ball 8c Co..Kinney Tobacco Company and Goodwin & Co.,pos-
sessing 90% of the cigarette business,united to form the 
American Tobacco Companyi^his concern was the center of 
further consolidation in other branches. In 1898 the Con-
tiaeMal Tobacco Company was organized as a merger of the 
important plug tobacco interests. This step served to bring 
the chief plants in the plug business under the domination 
of the American. The American and the Continental formed 
the American Snuff Company in 1900. In the meantime the 
old combination had been acquiring manufacturers of smok-
ing tobacco,and had organized a cigar company as one of 
its subsidiaries.After reorganization of the various 
properties thus secured into first, the Consolidated To-
bacco Company of 1901 and finally the new American Tobacco 
Company of 1904, the Tobacco combination had substantial 
monopoly over the domestic field inall branches except Mfc 
high-grade cigars. Moreover in 19ol it had joined the 
Imperial Tobacco Company of Great Britain for the purpose 
of exploiting the tobacco trade of the world,outside of 
the United States and England. For this purpose a new 
subsidiary,the British-American Tobacco Company was created. 
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The successive combinations in the tolacco indust 
ry were promoted by one group of interests and represented 
merely the methods by which one concern extended its'mono-
polistic control. Each of these consolidations contributed 
something to the restriction of competition. Tor the sfcke 
of convenience,the reasons prompting these various organi-
zations will be considered as if each constituted a separate 
problem,that is from the viewpoint of the manufacturer ens 
entering the trust. Then inthe discussion of method the 
same subject will be reviewed for an insight into the 
policy of the combination. The inquiry will be conducted 
to determine how much emphasis was placed on superior 
efficiency by the organizers themselves. The revalent ^ 
testimony comes from the records of the genesis of the 
consolidations and their subsequent actions. 
The original combination was probably inspired 
-partly by economic motives, in spite of its enormous ovea? 
capitalisation ,a stock issue of .$25,000,000 on a basis 
of tangible property worth $5,000,000. (a) Previous attempts 
at pooling had failed,and there had been a severe competit-
ive struggle in the cigarette trade,which had occasioned 
heavy expenditures for advertising and premiums. The desire 
to eliminate this waste was a laudable one. It is very 
doubtful,however, whether the owners even seriously considered 
this, when actually contemplating combination,. In fact re-
cent evidence tends to prove that the-trade war itself 
(a) Bureau of corporations,Tobacco Industry,! p.2 
- 5 7 -
was incited "by the very men who afterwards became prominent 
in the American Tobacco Company,for the purpose of hasten-
ing its advent.(fe) Certainly the moving spirits of the 
new enterprise looked forward expectantly to the monopoly 
power that would enable them to extort large profits. The 
same men realized that a great saving in the cost ofpro-
duction could be effected if all the largest plants could 
use the best cigarette machines,patents of which were held 
by one or two concerns. Here was a legitimate advantage 
but it was to be made the basis of monopoly. The financial 
manipulation that occupies so large a part of the history 
of the American Company shows that the obvious intent was 
carried out,Insofar as this element predominates,one must 
conclude that the trust movement in the tobacco industry 
is undesirable. This does not deny that the organization 
may not be relatively as efficient as the independents 
but it does m^an that the economies actually realized have 
been small in proportion to those that are potentially 
possible and that its disadvantages so outwe^gS^s]advantages 
that competitive conditions are preferable to monopolistic 
The format inn of the Continental Tobacco Company, 
the plug combination,was impelled by the Plug Tobacco WAr, 
waged by the American company to secure control. The pro-
motion of this company was made possible by the opportunity 
68'floating a tremendous stock issue in 1898,which the 
organizers, the American Tobacco interests were not slow 6 
(a)U.S. vs.Am. Tob, Co, Brief, 221TJ, S.lW^ 
also in Stevens, Industrial Combinations,etc p. 419 
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to sieze. The original capitalization of the Continental 
was no less than $62,290,700 in stock,about equally divided 
/a) 
between preferred and common. The common stock represented 
no real value,being given as a bonus. The presence of"watered » 
stock indicates that "financial" considerations were upper 
most in the minds of the promoters,and not desire to secuee 
efficiency. The purchase of the Liggett and Myers Company 
strengthens this opinion. 
The new combination had scafeely been launched be 
fore formidable competition appeared. Had it been thorough 
ly efficient and fortified by superior ability,it would ne* 
have been disturbed by the prospect. Yet no sooner had 
Thomas J, Ryan,P.A.B. Widener,A.N.Brady ,W.C. Whitne3r and 
Thomas Dolan,formed the Union Tobacco Company and obtained 
an option on Liggett & Myers than the Continental interes&s 
became alarmed at the threatened loss of control and bought 
out its competitors at a high price. The deal was made by 
an increase in the capitalization of the Continental by 
$35,000,000. At the same time the financial interests repre-
sented by the men above mentioned,took the places of some 
of the old manufacturers ,Ginter,Kimball and Emery,(who were 
opposed to the American's campaign of extension) in the 
councils of the American Tobacco Company. This change in 
personel was followed by a policy of financial manipulation.(b 
The American Snuff and the American Cigar Companies 
organized in 1900,present the same objectionable features. 
(a)Bureau of Corporations,Tobacco Industry,part I,p. 100 
(b)Blhia pp.73-7^,100 
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(a) commissioner of Corporations,Tobacco Ind. I,p.33,34, 
that characterized the earlier combinations,namely the facili-
tation of centalization of control by the opportunity that 
existed for the fls*l*ion of inflated securities. 
The formation of new companies accomplished the object 
of their promoters. The business of the American Tobacco Com-
pany has been widely increased and extended until in 1906,it 
controlled 82per cent of the total output of plug tobacco,71 
per cent of the smoking tobacco,81 per cent of the fine cut, 
and 96 per cent of the snuff. At the same time it practically 
maintained its original proportion of the cigarette .business. 
(82.3 per cent in I906)and increased its production of cigars 
from 4 per cent of the total in 1899 to 14.7 per cent in 1906 . . 
It consumed 400,000,000 pounds of leaf tobacco in 1906. (a) 
Whether this dominion over the tobacco industry is th 
the result of inherent ability to manufacture brands at lowest 
cost or whether it is the oubome of practices,designed to 
monopolize trade and to restrain normal competition,is a 
question of the methods of the American Tobacco Company. Much 
pertaining to this subject has already been revealed in con-
nection with the discussion of the causes and the intent of 
the various combinations. The acts that p̂ sdceeded fom this 
original purpose may be summed up under five heads,(1) Trade 
Wars, (2) Company-Organization, (3) Acquisition of Competitors, 
(4) Bogus Independent Companies, and (5) Factor's Agreements. 
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The American Tobacco Company has conducted three 
trade wars for the control of different branches of the 
business. The first of these,the so-called Plug Tobacco Wat 
commencing in 1894,was the most important. 
The eombination of the cigarette manufacturers ws 
in 1890 was not immediately followed by consolidation in 
other lines. In fact,there was no tendency in that direction. 
The American,however,fi*omnitsvinception,had begun to build 
up a plug business,but its efforts had fallen far short of 
the desired goal,which was monopolistic control. Finally 
when the futility of the attempt to secure by ordinary pur-
chase the dominion,8ought for,became apparent\ it instituted 
a trade war. It began by selling its famous "fighting"brand, 
"Battle Axe" atllS cents a pound and out of this it paid tie 
revenue tax of 6 cents a pound. The net price was below the 
cost of production. For several years it carMededn the plug 
campaign at an annual loss of at least a million dollars, 
which was paid out of the profits of its cigarette business. 
Bn 1898 the competitive warfare ended in the leading plug 
manufacturers entering a combination,under its direction. 
Similarly, the Snuff War was responsible for the 
Snuff Combination of 190Q and the conflict threatened by the 
American's invasion of England,caused the 3aa?igest British 
Company to become party to an agreement with it. 
Thus the American Tobacco Company used the monopoly 
in the Cigarette business as a vantage ground for the purpose 
(a) Coimissioner,Corpomtions,If^baaica'Jlnd. I, p.46 
of commencing trade conflicts,designed to injure its compe4 
titors and to force them into combination with it. the 
pesent position of the American is proof of the success with 
which its work was attended. 
The very nature of the numerous organizations is 
further evidence of the manner in which a few men obtained 
the control of the tobacco industry. 
For example,the Consolidated Tobacco Company was 
formed in July,1901,with a capitalization of $40,000,000. a 
At that time,the efcrnmbn-stoekiiolders of the Americ&h andrtie 
Continental (the plug tobacco) companies received an offer of 
4 per cent Consolidated bonds for their securities. The basis 
of exchange was to be $800 in bonds for each $100 of .Ameri-
can common stock,and $100 in bonds for $100 Continental common. 
The offer was universally accepted. 
This transaction was then regarded as very favorskle 
to the common stockholders.The Continental stock had never 
paid a dividend and was quoted at about $30. The former 
holders of this stock were now entitled to 4rt on par. The 
stockholders of the American,who had been receiving 6^ in 
dividends were now guaranteed to 8% interest on the same 
investment. The whole operation,nevertheless,turned out to 
be enormously profitable, to the men behind the Consolidated 
Company,because the profits accruing to the common-stock 
holders soon greatly increased. The financial interests ,Jlho 
were in position to foresee coming events,received the entire 
benefit. -(a) 
(a) Commissioner,Corporations,Tobacco Ind. I p.11 
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Again,the gomnation of the new American Tobacco 
Company in 1904 to suneed the Consolidated was undertaken 
primarily to strengthen the Combination's legal position, 
then imperiled by the Northern Securities Case.It also 
servedtto give the holders of $40,000,000 of common-stock 
sole voting power and consequently complete control of a 
corporation,capitalized at $316,000,000. (a) 
Both of these financial operations were accom-
plished by enormous inflation of securities,the over-valu-
ation of good will alone amounting to$ll0,000,00O. (b) 
Company-organization,therefore ,iwasi usedlas a 
method to centralize control into the hands of Ahgemenon 
who were instrumental in building up monopoly in the to-
bacco business. Financial manipulation certainly cannot be 
reconciled with any claim of efficiency. 
A third method,post frequently employed by the 
Combination was to buy out competing: plants,not for the 
purpose of utilizing them, but to destroy their competition 
The most important concern acqdted for this reason was the 
Liggett and Myers Sompany, (see P.58) This practice has 
been facilitated by stock-purchase,that is,the purchase 
of a majority of the securities of the rival company and 
not of its entire property.In this way the American TobacO 
Company has acquired 250 plants,some of which have been 
continued as subsidiaries,and the rest dismantled, (c) 
(a) Commissioner,Corporations - Tobao£o Ind. I,p. 12 
(b) Ibid II.,pl31. (c) Ibid. j,P 41 
This was a continuous process,as new independents were con-
stantly springing up. 
The Combiaation's policy of "buying out competitor 
has resulted in its obtaining the most improved machines 
which has given it a real advantage. 
The f oufcth method employed by the Combination to 
restrict competition was the maintenance of bogus indepen-
dent companies. In order to. take -the advantage of the 
senti^ment against "trusts",the American Tobacco Company 
has openly advertised concerns really under its domination 
as # independent". The managers of these "fake" companies 
represented to the trade that their goods were "not made 
by a trust,B Some of them even hired union labar and there-
by secured custom which the American Company,because of its 
known hostility to organized labor,could not get, (iO 
Finally, the Combination has imposed upon number 
of persons,stipulations of one kind and another,having for 
their general object the restriction of competition. Some 
of these tefek the form of factors' agreements,whereby deaJars 
were required to purchase exclusively of the Combination. 
In other cases manufacturers were compelled to bind them-
selves not to compete in the future. 
To review the facts pointing to the evident ia-
tentionofif certain mm to acquire dominion in this field,not 
for the purpose of eliminating cdmpetitive waste,but to con-
trol pricesJand to consider the methods which they pursued 
in the actual accomplishment of this purpose,is to be convinced 
that superior efficiency does not account for the presence 
of this gigantic industrial combination. 
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The profits of the American Tobacco Company have 
been exorbitant. The average return on its investment in 
all branches has in no year been less than 37.6 per cent, 
while it has frequently exceeded 60 per cent. On the other 
hand,the Independentsparatoniy 1519" pdr^cent,on the average 
according to the estimate of the Bureau of Corporations.(a) 
Since the independents do not sell at a lower price than 
the Combination,this would seem to indicate that the latter 
was far more efficient than its smaller rivals. While the 
American no doubt"-does possess an ad vantage, because of the 
immense size of its factories and its control of the best 
machines,its superiority is by no means as great as lis 
implied by this comparison. 
In the first place,an analysis of the Combination's 
rate of prof its, shows that it is low on branches, where com-
petition is active,and high where it is repressed. Thus the 
cigarette group,where monopoly is almost complete,earned 98 
per cent on its total investment and 33o per cent on its 
tangible assets in 1908.The American SnuffCompany,which con-
trols 96 per cent of the snuff business,reported a return 
of 30.1 per cent on its total investment and 39.3 per cent 
on its tangible assets in the same year. Now contrast these 
profits with those of the American Cigar Compamyswhieh has 
but 14 per cent of the cigar business. Its earnings in 1908 
were but 4 per cent of its tan#le pt^ptMBfty-. In 1908 it was 
operated at a loss of 17.1 per cent of its total investment 
(a)Commissioner,Corporations Tobacco Ind. II., p.333 
(b) Ibid, pp.177,268,389. 
The conclusion is unavoidable that the profits of the Com-
bination would be eiren greater in the entire absence of 
competition. 
The independents now in existence are not fair re-
presentatives of the S$nd of concerns,produced by competition 
conditions,because there has been a continual defection of 
the most efficient to the ranks of the trust. Therefore the 
desirabiLity of the Combination is not finally established 
by *hgr ability to surpass them in profits or productive costs. 
But thirdly and most important is the fact that 
the sources of the huge profits of the Combination do not 
reflect credit upon it. It is certainly possible that other 
influences besides efficiency may have contributed to its 
profits. 
First,for several years its gains were swelled by 
the full amount of the reduction of the Spanish War-tax on 
tobacco. In 1898 the internal revenue taxvon tobacco had 
been raised from 6 to 12 cents aipound. The retail price of 
tobacco products was adjusted,so that the tax was shifted 
to the consumer.But -aflt&902" theltasj: was reduced to its old 
level,with no corresponding deoredsej in the price. The action 
of competition would have aowered prices automatically,but 
under monopolistic control of the industry the Combination 
Incfeffedt exercised the taxing power, (a) 
(a) Commissioner Corporations Tobacco Ind. II. P-245 
ocnOfcy the mere ownership of the popular "brands of to-
bacco yields a return to the American Tobacco Company al-
together out of proportion to the capital invested. The 
fact that this advantage was aquired by unfair methads and 
not.. 
wasjythê resttltaBî rndKQialojtevelopment makes its possession 
no source of credit to the Combination. 
3. The Trust,has further increased its profits by 
paying less than the union scale of wages to its employees. 
BEcause of the wide distribution of its plants,it has been 
able to jiakecAhiSoriidhotionoinsitailabirr.cost. Thus it tranS 
ferred work from its St.Louis to its South Carolina plants 
in order to avail itself of cheapnchild labor in the South. 
4, The acquisition of the patents on the best machines 
used in the manufacture of cigarettes and other products, 
h&Sag&wan #iie eombination another source of profits,which 
cannot be attributed to efficiency,because it is in the 
nature of a special privelige. 
Thus profits,huge in the aggregate, have accrued 
to the Combination by reason of the possession of popular 
brands,of exclusive patent rights,and because of the re-
duction of the War-Tax,and its ability to drive a hard bar-
lain with laborapThgrse influences combined have caused a 
tremendous appreciation in the market quotations of its se-
curities,amounting in the case of the common-stock of the 
American tobacco Company to nearly 1,000 per cent in 22 
years. (a) 
(a) Commissioner Corporations- tobacco Ind. II. P-38 
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"These enormous profits resulting from the inflai 
tion of the securities and the dividends paid thereon rest", 
says Herbert Knox Smith in his report on the Tobacco Industry, 
"in their ultimate analysis,upon the monopolistic advantage 
obtained in this industry through concentration ofi controlV (a) 
-Sffibh "monopolistic advantage"i&sfcis referred to lr 
by the former Commissioner is Synonomous with.the adwaijtage 
that comes from that "restraint of trade",within the mean-
ing of the Sherman law. It is derived from "the power to 
control and at will to enhance prices^- a power that in turn 
arises from the jfctat&ation of theuunhampered right to en-
gage in trade and commerce. Such being the edements of strength 
of the American Tobacco Company,it is evident thatcd&sinoaft 
tinued existence is so inseparably connected with acts that 
are repugnant to the spirit of free institutidnsB,that it 
is the plain duty of the courts to dissolve it and to restore 
competition. 
How this is to be effectively accomplished is a 
difficult problem,especially so in the light of the apparent 
failure of the dissolution proceedings,recently instituted. 
Prohibition of stock-ownership of subsidiaries,by the parent 
company,had aughaiodreaomffiendait as a remedy. The American 
Tobacco Company was built up like a house of cards,without 
any solid basis of efficiency, and it may be expected to 
tumble down when its real nature is once comprehended. 
(a) Commissioner of Corp,,Tobacco Ind. II. p.38,332, 
V/4 
C H A P T E R IV. 
THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION. 
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Chapter IV. The United States Steel Corporation 
The pools in the steel industry had failed to 
prevent wide fluctuations in prices and severe competition 
among the manufacturers. The Carnegie Steel, Company had taken 
4£ken some of the features of a combination,hut in general 
it may be said that competition was the distinguishing 
characteristic of the trade prior to 1898. (a) 
By 1900 the consolidation movement was far advanced 
Three important combinations were engaged in the manufacture 
of crude and semi-finished steel. The Morgan interests had. 
promoted the Federal Steel Company,the Moore group was re-
sponsible for the formation of the National Steel Company 
and the Carnegie- Company had long been in the field. 
Amalgamations also occurred among concerns manu-
facturing the more advanced products. The American Steel 
and Wire Company, the National Tube Company,the American 
Bridge Company, the American Sheet Steel Company,thd Ameri-
can Tin Plate Company and the American Steel Hoop Company 
were all organized during 1899 or the early part of 1900. 
Of these,the three latter were Moore concerns and depended 
upon the National Steel Company for their supply of crude 
steel. The National Tube and the American Bridge Companies 
belonged to the Morgan group and were consequently affiliated 
with the Federal Steel Company, (b) 
In 1901, the United States Steel Corporation was 
formed as a consolidation of the previous consolidations. 
(a) Commissioner,Corporations on Steel Ind. I,p.2,75. 
(b)Ibid , pp.5,9,10. 
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Wh.eth.er this tendency toward concentration that 
culminated in the formation of the Steel Corporation pro-
ceeded from a desire on the part of the principals to se-
cure the benefits of more efficient production or whether 
ite;; wase influenced by Other and less praisworthy motives 
is a question to be answered by an analysis of the con-
trolling causes. 
The Bureau of Corporations assigns three reasons 
to account for the rapid spread of combination in the Steell 
industry. These rare: (a) 
1. The restriction of competition through combination 
2. Integration. 
3. The creation of a large amount of inflated securities. 
These were the predominating forces' behind the earlier 
combinations, and they were repeated on a vaster and more 
comprehensive scale in the organization of the Corporation . 
The formation of quasi-monopolistic concerns 
in various branches of the steel trade did not settle the 
industrial situation. A competitive war of giganticcpro-
portions soon threatened to break out between these larger 
units. This alarming condition was brbught about by the 
tendency of the "secondary" companies(i,e, those engaged 
in the further elaboration of crude or semi-finished steel) 
to secure greater integration and to ifiake themselves inde-
pendent of the "primary" concerns,by purchasing ore resemes 
and blast furnaces. Thus the best customers of the Carnegfc 
(a) Commissioner,Corporations on Steel Industry I, P 4. 
(b) Ibid, p. 7. 
7̂ 2 
and Federal Steel Companies prepared to become theirhdhfef 
rivals. The Carnegie Company ; promptly retaliated by 
entering into the production of finished steel goods. It 
gave an indication of its belligerent attitude by announcing 
its intention of immediately building a tube mill on Lake Erie, 
Aside from the wasteful duplication of plant and 
equipment,which this step would have entailed,there were 
considerations which would have caused a struggle at this 
time to affect disastrously the recently-promoted combinations. 
The new-comers were heavily over-capitalized and in no 
position to stand a fight. The value of their securities 
was still uncertain,being wholly dependent on the maintenance 
of undisturbed prosperity. This applied particular^ to 
the Moore and Morgan Concerns. 
The Carnegie interests,on the other hand,had no 
entangling stock-market alliances. They had devoted their 
whole attention to the industrial side of the business 
and had succeeded in buiHing up a plant of remarkable 
efficienpy. Thus they were abundantly fortified to meet 
any emergency. (a) 
The only way to avert the impending competition' 
was to buy out Mr. Carnegie. He controlled the situation, 
so he could be expected to name his own price. The amount 
of cash required to fiffect this would have been too great 
for even Moore and Morgan to raise. But,fortunately for . 
these latter interests the demand for trust securities had 
not yet abated. ' Because of this,they were'enabled to float 
(a) Meade, Trust Finance pp. 806.-Sll. 
tlie Steel Corporation and to pay Carnegie with its bonds. 
The extent to which the financial managers avail-
ed themselves of the opportunity to create and to dispose 
of a great amount of inflated stock,is shown by the immense 
over-capitalization of the consolidation that followed. 
The properties of the Corporation were valued at 
$1,402,846,817 by its own appraisers at its inception. 
The chief securities issued and their par:? values owe re: (a) 
preferred stock $510,205,743,common stock $508,227,394, 
and bonds $303,450,000. The Bureau of Corporations,after 
an extensive investigation estimated that the true valu-
ation of the Steel Corporation's physical property was 
about $700,000,000. Thus the excess or1 amount of "water" 
was $700,000,000. The main point of difference between 
the Bureau and the Corporation came in regard to the proper 
* 
value of the ore leases. The facts presented by the former 
tend to prove that the valuation ofa$lna ton,placed by the 
Corporation upon its estimated tonnage of 700,000,000.«&e 
absurdly high and that 13 cents a ton,or a total of 
$100,000,OOOwas entirely sufficient to cover their actual 
worth*in 1901. (b) 
Very convincing evidence of excessive capitalizatic 
is afforded by the enormous payment the Steel Corporation 
allowed its underwriting syndicate. It appears that a 
commission equivalent to the huge sum of $62,500,000 in 
cash îsrent to these men for their services, (c) 
(a) Commissioner,Corporations on r Steel; Ind. I, pl4. 
(b) Ibid, p. 35. 
(c) Ibid, p. 38. 
The immediate causes of this great consolidation 
do not point to superior efficiency. If/.the Carnegie Com-
pany had carried out its plans and had succeeded in extend 
ing its operations until they covered every branch of the 
steel trade,then monopolistic position could be traced to 
compelling merit alone. In other words had competition 
been allowed to take its course,although it would have 
worked much hardship,it would have inevitably eliminated 
the unfit and probably it would have resulted eventually 
in the domination of some concern like the Carnegie Oompaay, 
The combination,that was actually formed,was handicapped 
at the outset by the possession of plants, use less for the 
purposes of trade.It had been undertaken for the purpose 
of preserving the financial standing of allied Moore and 
Morgan companies,and the realization of this object was 
made possible by the opportunity to dispose of "watered" 
stock to the public. Neither of these gave the Combination 
any advantage in productive costs. 
The significant feature.of the later development 
of the Steel Corporation has been the constant augmentation 
of its ore reserves. The acquisition of the Tennessee Coal, 
Iron and Railroad Company in 1907 increased its holdings 
of coal by a probable 1,300,000,000 tons and of iron ore 
by 697,350,000 tons.^y the lease of the most valuable of 
the ore properties of the Great Northern Railway System, 
the Corporation acquired control of aotllass than 5O0,0O0QOO. 
tons of high grade iron ore. Although1 has since cancelldd 
/-^nmmissioner. Corporationspn Steel Ind. I.,p.257 
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this contract,the extreme liberality of the terms,is con-
clusive evidence as to a desire on its part to obtain,even 
at high cost,the control of this limited natural resource. 
Besides the increase in the plant capacity of the 
Corporation due to numerous acquisitions,it has made fur-
ther additions by new construction,of which the Gary plant 
is the most important. 
In spite ofthese extensions and an absolute increase 
in its production,theCorporation has failed to maintain it 
original position. Its proportion of the entire output of 
ingots and castings fell from 66,3 per cent in 1901 to 54.7 
per cent in 1910*,of finished rolled products from 50.1 per 
cent in 1901 to 48.1 per cent in 1910\ andof wire nails 
from 65.8 per cent of the total in 1901 to 55.4 per cent 
in 1910. Only in the production <&f ore and blast furnace 
products has it held its own. (a) 
As pointed out by Mr, Brandeis,this was not due to 
lach of facilities. In fact, alarge number of the plants t 
of the Corporation were idle in 1910. Thus with a capacity 
of 16,240,700 tons for semifinished steel products,it manu-
factured only 11,831,398 tons in 1910, with a pig iron ca-
pacity of 18,039,000 tons it produced but 14,179,369 tons 
and with a rolled steel capacity of 14,547,336 tons it 
produced only 10,733,955 tons. Thus in 1910 fully one-
fourth of the capacity was unused,in 1901 less than four 
per cent. Although it increased -Lko piuducllun of the pro 
ducts of its blast furnace 72.58 per cent,steel ingots 
60.13 per cent and rolled steel 44,54 per cent,it thus failed 
fa) CommlssToner.Cnr^orations Steel Ind.I.££.,P 560-365, 
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t6tkeeptpafeeu§i$fcep with the growth of the industry or its 
own plant capacity, (a) 
However,in the face of an extraordinary demand 
for iron and steel products,prices have been maintained at 
a high level, so that it is probable that the Corporation 
has preferred to earn a high rate of profits on a business 
somewhat less than its capacity would warrant,rather than 
to drive out its competitors by cutting prices to a point 
that would make its total profits less on a much larger 
volume of sales. 
#3 .profits. 
The profits of the Steel Corporation have been 
large,if measured by the actual investment,amounting in 
9 3/4 years (1901-1910) to the total of $1,100,350,857 
or to an annual average of 12 per cent on the tangible 
assets. They were distributed as f o l l o w s : . 
Total Investment •Earnings (adjusted 
YEAH (end.Dec. 51) in tangible assets: AMOUNT PER CEffT 
1*01(9 moB.) $698,369,756. $77,741,231. 14.8 
1902 
8  77,74
763,574,919. 121,502,344. 15.9 
806,515,979. 94,156,958. 11.7 
1904 818,238,143. 62,491,950. 7.6 
1905 874,840,930. 112,830,835. 12.9 
1906 947,397,884. 143,393,707. 15.1 
1907 1,078,763,502. 155,416,873. 14.4 
1908 1.090,425,487. 84,793,296. 7.8 
1909 1,146,875,993. 130,807,579. 10.5 
1,186,982,038. 127,216,084, 10.7 
faj[: Commissioner of Corporations,on Steel Ind. I.,p 269-71 
(» Ibid, p. 342. 
-76-
The elements of strength of the Steel Corporation 
are revealed by the ultimate sources of these pfcofits . 
There are two ways in which an excess of pf of it, over that 
normally realized in competitive trades,has originated. 
First,the possession of certain limited facilities or 
means of production has enabled the Corporation to surpass 
its rivals in reducing costs and thereby to add the diffei? 
ence to its ordinary profits. Secondly,the ability to ex«»-r 
such a prepondering influence on prices*ifcat natural com-
petitive forces are checked,has afforded the Corporation 
as well as competitors existing "under its wing" a fmr-
ther gain. 
"In so far as the Steel Corporation enjoys monopo— 
listic power,Ssajtd Herbert Knox Smith in his letter to the 
President,"it lies chiefly in these two factors.«Sgefef#tn 
ed to the large profits on(l) ore and (E)railroad trans-
portation, -(a) 
The Corporation earned 1Q per cent on its whole 
ore holding.The significance of this is made clear by the 
same authority. "Thus,while earning 10 per cent,the Steel 
Corporation can also carry a vast ore reserve far in ex-
cess of its present requirements and so large as to have 
distinctly monopolistic features,can exercise on the en-
tire industry the undefined but real power that such con-
centration of the ultimate resource must give,and can as-
sure itself of the certain increment of value that will 
inevitably occur with the diminishing of our available 
(a)Commissioner Corp.,Steel Ind. Part ^Preliminary^xvii 
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ore supply so long as the existing conditions of concen-
tration are allowed to continue." (a) 
The Corporation has the field of railroad trans- ^ 
portation to itself,owning the two most important ore 
roads in the Lake Superior region,the Duluth and Iron 
Range and the Duluth,Missabe and northern. The rates on 
ore:;on-these ..lines were,hefore their reduction in 1911, 
indeed unreasonable,thus not only yielding a big revenue 
to the Steel Corporation,but imposing a burden on such of 
its competitors as were compelled to use their services. 
The operating expenses of both these roads are remarlably 
low,because offthe declining cost of ore transportation. 
Thus the ratio of operating expenses to gross earnings 
for the Duluth, Mi ssabe and Northern was below 30 per cent, 
as against an average for all the railroads in the country 
of 66 per cent,while that £6r the Duluth and Iron Range 
in 1910 was only 36.5 per cent. Notwithstanding this, 
freight rates were maintained at the same level for 10 
3rears,so that the earnings of these roads have been immense, 
ranging from 100 to 150 per cent on the capital stock, (h) 
The possession of the most valuable of these two 
basic agencies of production may be expected to give the 
Steel Corporation a pronounced advantage over its rivals 
in the cost of production. 
(a) Commissioner,Corp.,On Steel Ind.II(Preliminary)p.xvii 
(b) Commissioner,Corp.,Report on Steel Ind. I,pp.374-675. 
In comparing the costs of the Steel Corporation 
with those of the Independents,only the "bare costs,obtain-
ed by subtracting the.inter-company profits from the book 
costs,are used. In doing this,it is to be remembered that 
the investment of the highly integrated concern,is much 
larger than that of the smaller non-integrated companies 
and that consequently a larger margin between the cost of 
production and the ssllingfprice is required by the Steel 
Corporation to enable it to earn the same return on the 
investment as Its competitors. 
The Bureau of Corporations makes no direct com-
parison between the cost of production of the Steel Cor-
poration and that of the independents. It combined the 
cost figuresof the four largest steel companies,the 
Lackawanna,Republic,Jones and Laughlin and the Steel Corjr-
poration for the period,1902-1906,for the purpose of con-
trasting them with corresponding figures for the smaller 
concerns. In 1910,however,the Steel Corporation made pub-
lic its own costs,thereby furnishing a basissof comparison 
The Steel Corporation produced basic pig iron at 
a furnace cost of $10.09 a ton,the four largest companies 
including itself,at$ll.71 a ton,and the smaller at $13.59 
a ton. The Corporation turned out Bessemer pig iron at a 
furnace cost of $1.40 less than the largest companies,and 
$4.41 less than the smaller companies. For Bessemer bill** 
ingots the advantage of the Combination xvas #1.77 and.$6.38 
respectively. At the same time it cost it $16.67 at on to 
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produce heavy Bessemer rails inl9l0,while in the period 
1902-1906 when expenses were lower,the cost of the same 
product to the largest companies was $18.80 a ton. (a) 
The Steel Corporation has thus demonstrated its 
superiority over the field and it is established that it 
could,if it desired, wage a competitive warfare that would 
result in the annihilation of most of its rivals. 
However,there is no real competition between the 
Corporation and the independents. Prices are maintained Jar 
by tacit understandings called "gentlemen's agreements" 
by which competition as to prices has been greatly modified 
if not entirely prevented. Thus the price of steel rails 




The concentration of the control of indispensable 
natural resources,unless prevented,will give S6mbinations 
now in the field practically complete monopolistic power. 
Today it would be exceedingly difficult for a new concern 
to establish itself,but it is still possible. A check on 
the further centralization of coal and ore mines is a necessity .j 
Segregation of the industrial from the transpor-
tation interests of the Steel Corporation would be consistent 
with this policy. 
(a) Commissioner,Corporations,on Steel Ind.Preliminary to n . 
C H A P T E R V. 
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Chapter ?, The International Harvester Company. 
Monopolistic control over the harvesting machine 
business was established by the formation of the Inter-
national Harvester Company in 1902, as a result of the. 
consolidation of the five leading manufacturers: the 
MCCormick Harvesting Machine Company,the Deering Harvester 
Company,the Warder,Eushnell and Glessner CompanytChampion) 
the Piano Manufacturing Company,and the Milwaukee Harvest-
ins Company, (a) 
The companies in the merger together produced 90.9 
per cent of the country's binders,82.5 per cent of the 
per 
mowers and 67.8 per cent of the rakes. The percentage of 
of:..domestic sales controlled was 96.3 and 91.0 per cent 
of binders and mowers respectively. This was practically 
the degree of control possessed by the Combination at the 
outset. (b) 
A study of the origin,growth and methods of the 
Company will determine whether this merger increased the 
average'"efficiency of the several companies,i.e. whether 
the mere fact of combination created economies or got rid 
of any- rasteful features,or had the opposite effect. 
There are three motives commonly advanced to 
account for the organization of trusts. These are,desire ( 1 ) 
to eliminate competitive losses, (2) to obtain the econo-
mies of combination,and (3) to issue inflated securities. 
Insofar as the first two predominate,efficient production 
usually follows. ___— 




The Combination terminated a long period of keen 
competition amoi-g the manufacturers of harvesting machines, 
a competition which was described by Cyrus B. McCormick as 
"fierce" and as characterized by«unbusinesslike methods? 
The other owners also testified that there was wasteful ex 
penditure for high-salaried salesmen and advertising. With 
no agreement as to prices .frequent departures from listed 
prices £ rebates and concessions) were freely ©aden to get 
trade. John J, Clessner stated that before 1902 "it was a 
bitter fight between everybody to get business and get the 
better of your competitor." He toid/.further of the conditions 
that then existed, "We did everything that we could possibly 
do that would prevent our neighbor from making a sale. We 
had a large number of salesmen out on salary.and these 
men of course were instructed that they had to produce re-
sults. #' they would do anything to make a sale." When-
ever one man would take an order,representatives of the 
other companies would follow him and try to persuade the 
purchaser to cancel it. William H. Jones referred to this 
as"busting orders." CS.Funk testified that conditions 
we re »mo re like guerilla warfare than anything else, "and 
he continues to say, "I was sales manager of the Champion 
in later years#I know that my efforts were devoted as much 
to tearing down the other fellow's organization as buildiiqg 
up my own and I frequently spent several times over the 
price of a machine trying to make my own machine stick and 
to knock out the other fellows. " i3&r 
(a)Comm'er Corp. Report International Harvester Co. P 69 
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A review of this testimony points conclusively 
to the fact that combination was the result,primarily,of 
a desire to restrict competition that involved waste of 
much time and effort. 
The competition that existed prior to 1902 while 
severe, was not destructive. The l^Cormich Company earned 
11.7 per cent,the Deering 17.9 per cent and the Milwaukee 
11 per cent,the year before the merger. Thus competition 
had not destroyed profits, (a) 
A second cause of the Combination was the desire 
to secure the economies of monopolistic production, which 
while not so impoifcant,still had its influence. These are 
four in number; 
1. Large Scale Production,by distributing the fixed 
charges over a greater number of units ,reduces the cost 
per machine. 
2. Marketing costs are less under monopolistic pro-
duct ion, be cause a concern having a full line can supply 
the needs of the trade at lees expense -for deliveries 
than a number of small companies. 
3. The seasonal demand for agricultural implements re-
quires that a large amount of expensive implements be 
carried in stock, which in turn calls for a large investment 
4. The method of granting credit terms to farmers nomi 
in vogue^necessitates heavy financial backing and therefore 
large industrial establishments. 
All of these advantages^could be secured to a 
the greatest degree by one organization only. 
(a) Commier Corp.,On international iiarv. uo. p.4. 
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Financial manipulation had no place in the for-
mation of the Combination. The old interests remained in 
the new Company and the stock was closely held. Moreover 
the vigor of the trust movement was by 1902 quite spent 
so that the inflation of securities had ceased to be prof&able. 
Absence of over-capitalization is noteworthy. 
The International Harvester Company was capitalized 
at ^120,00g;0O0;$60,OO0,OO0 in"plant" stock to cover the 
investment in plant and equipment,and $60,000,000 in"cash" 
stock for the notes of the manufacturers. The property for 
which this "plant" stock was exchanged,was appraised by 
the agents of the Corporation at.$67,000,000,thus giving 
an apparent anxa^parentxsurplus of $7,000,000. That this 
was afterwards written off is proof that it was wholly 
fictitious. The Bureau of Corporations valued the same pro-
perty at £49,117,356,estimating that the ore lands leafcfed 
by the Deering Company alone were overvalued by $7,715,811. 
The Harvester Company's appraisal had been made a week af-
ter George W. Perkins had testified that the ore leases of 
the Steel Corporation were worth $1 a ton. Since he was 
promoting the Internationa}, th* Company was in no position 
to deny that the value of 42.5 and 35 cents a ton was ex-
cessive, (a) 
The Harvester Company possessed some real good 
will in connection with its physical property,worth at 
least $20,000,000,so that everything considered, it was 
very conservatively capitalized. 
(a) Comm'er Corp. International Earv. Co. p.126 
-85-
(a) Comm'er,Corp. Report international Harvester Co.,p269 
(b) Ibid, p 187. 
The second test of efficiency is found in tlie 
growth of the Combination. It is to be expected that if 
the Harvester Company really surpassed its competitors 
in merit,it would a±ss surpass them in increasing!its 
sales and thereby obtain a larger percentage of the total 
business. The Harvester Company Shows a slight tendency in 
the opposite direction. Thus its percentage of the total 
production of binders declined from 90.9 per cent to 87 
per cent from 1902 to 1911,of mowers from 82.5 to 76.6 per 
cent and its proportion of the domestic sales of binders 
decreased from 96.3 to 87.2 per cent and of mowers from 
91.0 to 74.6 per cent. (a) 
However,this loss was more than offset by the 
gains in foreign trade and in the "new lines". 
In 1909,the Harvester Company produced 13 per cent 
of the country'8 farm wagons,although it had entered that 
field just four years before. In the same year it also con-
trolled 25.9 per cent of the output of disk harrows,and 
49.1 per cent of spring tooth harrows,both new lines. These 
extensions brought on retaliatory measures from the concerns 
whose territory was thus invaded,with the result that the 
Combination lost ground in the old lines as above indicated. 
Thus the Harvester Company's claim of efficiency 
is not substantially affected by these changes. 
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The existence of unfair competitive methods,tends 
to qualify a combination's assertions as to its efficiency. 
It is important .therefore, to note to what extent they 
characterized the policy of the Harvester Company. 
The agents of the Bureau of Corporations visited 
800 retail dealers in 600 towns .scattered through 27 states, 
in order to determine how widely objectionable practices, 
on the part of the Combination,prevailed. While ordinarily 
tiie relations between these dealers and the Company,with 
wliich they had business dealings,would be friendly, 50 
per cent actually criticised its methods adversely and 
complained of the following tactics of the Combination; ($ 
1.Pretended competition in earlier years. Shortly after 
tlie merger,the new Trust acquired the Osborne Company,but 
for some time concealed the fact and maintained it as an 
independent concern. While apparently done at the request 
of the latter company,the Combination can not be alto-
gether cleared of the intent to injure its competitors in 
tliis fashion. 
2. Pull line forcing. This was the attempt to virtually 
compel:: dealers,handling some of its goods,to carry its 
lines exclusively. The contracts,having this purpose, 
proved so unpopular that they were speedily abandoned. 
3.Undue proportion of dealers. The desireable implement 
stores in any town seldom exceeds three. It is a practice 
of the Harvester Company to distribute its brands of har-
(a) Comm'er of Corp't'ns ,International Harvester Co.,p291 
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vesting macMnes in such a way that each dealer handles 
"but one,either the MCCormick, Champion or Deering. Thus 
the Combination secures the most active representation of . 
its goods and limits the outlet for its competitors. 
4. Suggested price lists. The old McCormick Company 
habitually stipulated the prices at which its products were, 
ibnst he sold to farmers. The Harvester Company for a time 
continued the same policy,hut subsequently gave it up. 
5. Price discrimination. This is so occasional as hardly 
to warrant mention. 
6. Misrepresentation of competitors by salesmen. This 
seems to have been due to the individuals themselves,as 
the Company appears to have given them no authority, 
implied or otherwise to indulge in it. 
Three of these improprieties were partly the re-
sult of faulty organization of the Combination in its 
earlier years,by which divisions corresponding to the old 
companies were kept up,and they have since been done away 
with. Only the third objection,the obtaining an undue 
proportion of dealers,has any present importance in handi-
capping competitors, 
On the whole,these praetieeBS lack the oppressive 
nature of the price discrimination of the Standard Oil 
Company or the trade wars of the American Tobacco Company, 
and consequently they cannot be said to constitute a very 
formidable indictment against the Harvester Company. 
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#3 Profits. 
The earnings of the Trust have been only moderate 
for the entire period of its existence,-the average rate 
on its investment being 8.47 per cent for the nine years 
1902-1911,according to the Bureau of Corporations. How-
ever within the last three years the average return has 
been considerably higher,-12.5 per cent. The significance 
of this showing lies in the sources of profits, (a) 
Thus while earning an average of 12.5 per cent 
on its whole business, the Combination has used its mono-
polistic position in the "old lines" to exact a higher 
rate-, on harvesting machines shdnatnthe same time to cut 
its prices and hence ato lower its profits on those branch 
in which it is striving to gain a foothold. Thus in 1911 
its trading profits on manure spreaders,a new line,were 
7.18 per cent,but on grain binders,ahiold!.line, 19,54 per 
cent, (b) 
Moreover,the increase in the rate of profits in 
recent years,has been due mainly to an increase in prices 
and not to added efficiency. The established reputation of 
its harvesting machines,enables it to charge more for its 
old lines than its rivals can obtain for their machines. 
In 1908.it arbitrarily raised the prices of grain, binders 
$7.50 to $lO,00.(according to their size) (d) 
(a) Comm'er,Corp1tfns,International Harvester Co.,p 238. 
(b) Ibid, p.242 
(c) " Ibid, p.248. 
It cannot be charged against the Harvester com-
pany,however,that it has discriminated against thBj^r^ 
can farmer,by selling at lower prices abroad t t o a a t £.ome. 
In fact,the reverse is true,as is shown by the following 
comparison of foreign and domestic prices, (a) 
ITEM DOMESTIC FOREIGN 
Grain binders,5-,6-,7-foot $102.64 $125.87 
Reapers 53.83 " 68.28 
Mowers 37111 41.09 
Rates 18.17 21.71 
Twine .074 .o83 
The factory cost of the products of theHarves-ter 
Company affords conclusive evidence as to its efficiency, 
compared with the independents. The average cost of tlae 
binders of the Combination was computed by the Bureau to 
be $56.32,and the corresponding average cost ifcoall *t!ie 
large independents was $76.18. The cost of production of 
mowers was $20.89,on the average,for the Trust anc $24*98 
for the independents. The Harvester Company manufactured, 
rakes at ran average expense of $2.10 less than its com-
petitors and it had an advantage almost as great in o-tner 
branches of production, (b) 
The superiority of the International Harvee-ter 
Company over the independents is therefore marked and con-
siderable . Whatever the moving cause of combinatior ™&- B » 
efficiency has certainly been the actual result. 
(a) Comm'er,Corp't'ns,International Harvester Co. P» 
(b) Ibid, pp.261,264. 
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Finally tliis distinct advantage over competitors, 
enjoyed "by the International Harvester Company,is due 
chiefly,according to the Bureau of Corporations to xha 
large scale production, (a) This advantage was used,how-
ever to increase the trade in new lines,rather than to 
reduce prices. 
#4 
Clearly,efficiency of production,so marked as 
this,should be encouraged,if the consumer could be 
allowed to participate in the benefits,thus created. 
The Company cannot be relied on to share its profits 
with the public voluntarily,and the maintenance' of 
plants of less efficiency,to act as price-regulators 
is of doubtful expediency,besides involving needless 
waste. The regulation of prices by Governmental action 
is yet untried,but in this e&se at least it would seem 
to have a reasonable assurance of success. 
(a) Comm'er,Corp*t'ns,International Harvester Go, ,p.£88-9 
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Chapter VI. Conclusion. 
It is evident from the preceeding discussion 
that it is impossible to formulate any satisfactory con-
clusion in regard to the efficiency of trusts or in-
dustrial combinations In general. Each presents its own 
problem,which must.be studied in the light of its parti-
cular aims,methods and results. 
The four combinations,which we have just examined) 
have usaakSh. demonstrated their inhdseat ability cfcosmapufacture 
goods at a lower cost per unit than the independents in 
their respective lines. 
However ,in the last analysis,the source of 
efficiency is really the important consideration and not 
the fact that trusts are comparatively efficient as units. 
It is apparent that most combinations that en-
dure for any length of time are based on some special ad-
vantage ,which lends itself especially to monopolistic pro-
duction. Thus the Standard Oil Company derived its main 
strength frqm the control of transportation facilities, 
the Steel Corporation from the ownership of ore leases 
and ore railroads,and the American Tobacco Company from 
the control of brands and patented processes. The Inter-
national Harvestsr Company alone succeeded by reason of 
the unaided advantage of large scale production. 
It is further clear that monopoly in one field 
of production may easily be made a vantage ground for ex-
tension of monopolistic control into hindred lines. 
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lfinally,it must be recognized that the possessidh 
of any degree of monopolistic power by a private corporation 
invariably leads to the strengthening and perpetuation of 
the monopolistic position and to the exclusion of com-
petitors from the market by unfair means. Hence, 
regulation,suited to the needs of the various kinds of 
combinations,is imperatively demanded. 
APPENDIX A 
POOLING AGREEMENTS. 
Memorandum o f a g r e e m e n t , e n t e r e d i n t o August 2,1887,"by-
e n d b e t w e e n t h e N o r t h C h i c a g o R o l l i n g M i l l Company,the 
C s m b r i a i r o n Company,the P e n n s y l v a n i a S t e e l Company,the 
Union S t e e l C o m p l n y , t h e Lackawanna S t e e l Company,the 
Jui te t S t e e l C o m p a n y , t h e w e s t e m S t e e l Company,the C l e v e -
l a n d R o l l i n g M i l l C o m p a n y , C a r n e g i e , p h i p p s & C o . L T D . , t h e B e t h -
lehem I r o n Company, t h e S r r a n t o n g t e e l Company,the T r o y 
S t e e l and I r o n C 0 ! , t h e W o r c e s t e r S t e e l Works and t h e 
S p r i n g f i e l d S t e e l company. 
W e , t h e b e f o r e - n a m e d companies and c o r p o r a t i o n s , m a n u -
f a c t u r e r s o f s t e e l r a i l s , h e r e b y m u t u a l l y a g r e e one w i t h t h e 
o t h e r , t h a t we w i l l r e s t r i c t o u r s a l e s and the p r o d u c t o f s t e i . 
r a i l s o f 50 pounds t o t h e y a r d and u p w a r d , a p p l y i n g t o o r d e r s 
t a k e n b y u s o r from our r e s p e c t i v e works d u r i n g the y e a r 1888 
a s h e r e i n a f t e r a l l o t t e d and l i m i t e d 5 , and we r e s p e c t i v e l y b i n d 
o u r s e l v e s n o t t o s e l l i n e x c e s s o f our c u r r e n t a l l o t m e n t s , 
w i t h o u t f i r s t o b t a i n i n g t h e c o n s e n t of t h e board o f c o n t r o l 
t h e r e t o , t h a t i s t o s a y ; 
I t i s a g r e e d , t h e r e s h a l l now be made a n a l l o t m e n t of860000 
t o n s o f r a i l s , w h i c h s h a l l be d i v i d e d and a p p o r t i o n e d t o and 
among t h e s e v e r a l p a r t i e s h e r e t o t o be s o l d by them d u r i n g t h 
y e a r 1888,upon t h e f o l l o w i n g b a s i s o f p e r c e n t a g e s , t o w i t * 
N o r t h C h i c a g o R o l l i n g M i l l Co , , 12©5% .Pennsy lvania S t e e l C o . 
9,Q%tBethlehem A i a a i j m m . I r o n C o . . 9 . 0 $ , C a r n e g i e fcros,&Co. , L t d . 
and C a r n e g i e , P h i p p s &0o. ( j o i n t l y ) , 1 3 . 5 $ , J o l i e t n S t e e l C o . , 8 $ 
Lackawanna I r o n a £ C o a l C o . , 8 $ , C a m b r i a j r o n e o , 5 8 $ , S c r a n t o n 
s t e e l C o . , 8 $ , U n i o n S t e e l Co,8%,Cleveland R o l l i n g M i l l C o . , 4 . 8 
TRoy S t e e l and J r o n Q O . , 4 . 5 % , W E s t e r n S t e e l 8 0 , , 4 . 5 $ , W o r c e s t e r 
S t e e l c o . , 1 . 4 $ . 
And i n a d d i t i o n t o t h s 800,000 t o n s o f r a i l s above a l l o t t d 
an a d d i t i o n a l a l l o t t m e n t s "bf 250,000 t o n s n i s h e r e b y made and 
a l l o t t e d n t o t h e B o a r d o f C o n t r o l , t o be r e a l l o t t e d and r e a p p o r 
t i o n e d b y i t , a s and t o whom i t may deem e q u i t a b l e , i n t h e a d -
j u s t m e n t o f a n y d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t may a r i s e . I t b e i n g a l s o f u r 
t h e r a g r e e d t h a t a l l s u b s e q u e n t a l l o t f m e n t s T o f r a i l s h e r e a f t r 
m a d e , t o be s o l d u n d e r t h i s a g r e e m e n t d u r i n g t h e y e a r 188axsfca 
s h a l l a l s o b e d i v i d e d and a p p o r t i o n e d t o t h e s e v e r a l p a r t i e s 
h e r e t o i n t h e same r a t i o of p e r c e n t a g e s a s s a i d a p p o r t i o n m e n t 
o f 80Q000 t o n s i s her*An d i v i d e d and a p p o r t i o n e d . 
I t i s f u r t h e r a g r e e d t h a t t h e Board o f C o n t r o l s h a l l , f r o m 
t i m e t o t i m e , m a k e such f u r t h e r a l l o t t m e n t s a s s h a l l l be 
• c e e s a r y t o a t a l l t i m e s k e e p t h e u n s o l d a l l o t m e n t s a t l e a s t 
200,000 t o n s i n e x c e s s o f t h s t o t a l c u r r e n t s a l e s , a s shown 
b y m o n t h l y r e p o r t s o f s a l e s . T h i s i s t o b e i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e 
t h e n u n a p p r o p r i a t e d p a r t o f t h e 250,000 t o n s h e r e i n b e f o r e 
a l l o t t e d t o t h e B o a r d o f C o n t r o l t o a d j u s t d i f f e r e n c e s . 
I t i s f u r t h e r a g r e e d , o n t h e f i r s t d a y it A p r i l , 0 J u l y 
and O c t o b e r , t h e B o a r d o f C o n t r o l a r e a u t h o r i z e d and d i r e c t e d 
t o c a n c e l s u c h p a r t o f t h e unmade a l l o t m e n t s o f t h e r e s p e c t * 
i v e p a r t i e s h e r e t o a s t h e y t h e s a i d B o a r d of C o n t r o l s h a l l 
d e t e r m i n e s u c h p a r t v t o be u n a b l e t o make i n d u e ^ l i ^ d - g 1 1 
a l l o t m e n t s s o c a n c e l l e d t h e B o a r d of C o n t r o l s h a l l h a v e t i e 
r i c h t t o r e a l l o t t o any o f , t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o , i t b e i n g u n d e r 
s t o o d t h a t a l l s u c h c a n c e l l a t i o n s B l l f t l x a p p l y o n l y t o a l l o t -
APPENDIX A (2) 
merits standing to the credit of the respective parties hereto 
on the dates above named,but no reallotment as aforsaid shall 
be made by the Board of Control to any of the parties hereto 
for the purpose of enabling them to sell rails from foreighn 
madebblooms. 
J t u i s further agreed,that all transfers o f parts of allot-
ments from one party to another shall be made by the Board. 
It is further agreed that there shall be a Board 4f Contra 
consisting of three members namely,errin W.Potter,Luther S, 
Bent s and W.W. Thurston,who shall have power to. employ a 
paid secretaryland treasurer. 
It is further agreed that* the Board of Controlupon the 
written consent of 75$ of the percentages as hereinbefore 
named,shall increase the allotments for the year 1888 and atuh 
such increase shall be allotted to the parties hereto as here 
inbefore provided. 
It is further agreed that each party whose name i s heKunto 
annexed,shall and will make monthly returns to the Board of 
Control of all contracts for delivery of rails 50 pounds to r 
the yard and upward during the year 1888 and also of all ship 
ments of such rails made by them during said year. 
I t Is further agreed,that allparties thereto shall and wil 
on or before Jam. 15,1888,make a written aetum to the Board 
of Control of all rails 50 pounds to the yard and upwrd which 
they respectively had on hand jan. 1,1888, stating whether the 
seune are sold and If sold,on what order they apply,. 
It is further agreed, that tha Board o f Cotrol s h a l l r h a v e 
the right whenever they deem it expedient to convene a m e e t i g 
of the parties hereto,and they shall give at least 10 days 
previous notice of all meetings,and'receiving 75 % of the v 
votes present thereat either in person or by proxy,shall bs 
binding on all the parties hereto except a change in the per-
centages as aforsaid. 
The Board of Control shall be required to call a meeting t 
of the parties hereto when requested to do so in writing,sign 
ed by any three of the contracting parties,but such request & 
and such notice shall statethe object for which the meeting 
is callesh 
The Board of Control shall have authority to levy an 
assessment,pro rata to the allotted tonnage,to defray the 
actual expenses made necessary to carry out the agreement. 
It is further agreed ,thatwe wilD,5respectively, 
immediately make return to the Board of Control of all rails 
of 50 pounds to the yard and upward which we are now under 
contract to deliver during the year 1888,said return to state 
to whom such rails are sold and to whom they are to be 
delivered. 
(signatures) 
Taken from the Bureau of Corporatinfis Report on Steel 
Industry Part I ,p69-71. 
APPENDIX B 
THE SHERMAN ANTIfTRUST LAW. 
Act of July 2 1890,26 U.S.Stats, at Large,CLst Cong. 
1st Sees.,chap. 647,p.209. 
An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful 
restraints and monopolies. 
Be it enacted by the genate and Houee of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
Sec.I. Every contract,combination in the form fif trust 
or otherwise,or conspiracy, in restraint of ftrade:. or 
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations 
is hereby declared to be illegal.Every person who shall 
make any such contract or engage in any such contract or 
conspiracy,shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceed-
ing $5,000,or by imprisonment for one year,or "by both, said 
punishments,in the discretion of the court. 
Sec.2 Bveryiperson who shall monopolize,or attempt to 
monopolize,or combine or conspire with any other peraonu 
or persons,to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States or with foreign nations, 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,and,onconviction 
thereof,shall be punished by fine not exceeding $5,000£ 
or by Imprisonment not exceeding one year,or by both said 
punishments, in the discretion of thecourt. 
Sec.3 Every contract,combination in form of trust or othr 
wise,or conspiracy,in restraint o f trade o r commerce a; in 
any territory of the United States or of t h e District of 
Columbia,or in restraint o f trade or commerce b e t w e e n any 
such territory or territories and any State or States or 
the District o f Columbia,aEdwl]li|j: £6ara$gn nations,or "between 
the District o f Columbia and any State or States or f oreigi 
nations,is hereby declared to b e illegal, (penalty the seme 
8ec.4 The several circuit courts of the united states are 
hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain 
violations ©f this act,and it shall b e t h e duty of t h e 
several district attorneysof the United States,in their 
respective districts,under the direction of the Attorney 
General,to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and 
restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of 
petition setting forth the case and praying that such vio-
lation beieenjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the 
parties complained of shall have been duly notified of 
such petition the court shall proceed as soon as may b e , 
to the hearing and determination of the case,andpending 
such action and final decree,the court may at any time 
make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as 
shall be deemed just in the premises. 
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SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST LAW.-Cont. 
8ec. 5. Whenever it shall appear to the court before which 
any proceedings under section four of this act may be 
pending,that the ends of justice require that other parties 
should be brought before the coufct,the court may cause 
them to be summoned,whether they reside in the district in 
which the couirt is held or not,and subpoenas to that end 
may be served in any district by the marshall thereof. 
Sec. 6 . Any property owned under contract or by any com-
bination, or pursuant to any conspiracy (and being the sub-
ject thereof)mentioned in section one of this act,and be-
ing ia the course of transportation from one state to 
another or to a foreign country,shall be forfeited to the 
United States and may be s&ized and condemned by like 
proceedings as those provided by law for the forfeiture 
seizure,and condemnation of property imported into the 
United 8tates, contrary to law. 
8ec. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business 
or property by ahy person or corporation by reason of any 
thing forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, 
may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States 
in the district ia which the defendent resides or is found 
without respect to the amount in controversy,and shall re-
cover three fold the damages by him sustained,and the cos* 
of the suit, Including a reasonable attorney*0 fee, 
8ec. 8. That the word "person" or "persons" wherever used 
in this act shall be deemed to include corporations and 
associations existing under or authorized by the laws of 
either the Uhited States,or the laws of any of the 
territories,the laws of any statejor the laws of any 
foreign country. 
8tevens, Industrial Combinations and Trusts, pp.43-45. 
APPENDIX C 
A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE SOUTH IMPROVEMENT COMPANY AND 
THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD,JAN. 18,1872. 
Agreement made and enterda Into this 18th day of January 
in the year 1872,by and between the South Improvement com-
pany,a corporation organized and existing under the laws fS 
of the State of Pennsylvania,party hereto of the first pat 
and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company,on its own behalf 
and on behalf of all other railroad companies whose toads 
are controlled,owned or leased by it,or with which it has 
sufficient running relations,which other roads are describ 
ed as tjte connections of the said Pennsylvania Railroad 
Company,party hereto of the second part,witnesssbh : 
Whereas the party hereto of the first part has been or-
ganized for the purpose,among other things,of increasing, 
facilitating,and developing the trade in and the convey-
ance of and transpor tation of petroleum and its products 
and for that purpose,proposes ,among other things to ex-
pend large sums of money in the purchase, erect ion and con-
struction of,and maintaining and conducting works for 
storage ,distillation and re fining, warehousing and transpofc 
tation,and in various other ways,upon the inducement,among 
other thihgs of this contract 0. 
And whereas the magnitude and* extent of the business and 
operations proposed to be carried on by the party hereto £ 
of the first part will greatly promote the interest of the 
party hereto of the second part,and make it desireable for 
it,by fixing certain rates of freight,drawbacks,and rebate 
and by the other provisions of this agreement,to encourage 
the outlay of the party hereto of the first part,and to 
facilitate and increase the transportation to be received: 
And whereas it has been by and between theparty hereto £ 
of the second part,for itself and its connectiohs,the Epie 
Railroad Company for iiself and its connections,and the 
New York Central Railroad,for itself and its connections 
that the business of transporting by railroad of crude 
petroleum and its products toward the Atlantic coast,from 
the points of production and refining,ontheir lines of 
road,shall be allotted by the party fcereto of the first 
part 4o the said three railroads,in the proportion of 45fo 
of the total to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, •-"''### 
2 7 , 5 ^ of the total to the Erie Railway Company for itself 
and its connections,and 2 7 . 5 $ of the whole to the New York 
Central Railroad Company,for itself and its connections,ad 
that the transportation beyond Pittsburgh and Cleveland 
over the railroads of the said companies ahd their connect 
tions,in other directions: than toward the Atlantic coast, 
west from said points of production and refining,shall be 
allotted by the party hereto of the first part,in the pro 
portion of one-third thereof to the party hereto of the 
second part,for itself and its connections and the rest to 
other roads, 
Now therefore this agreement witnesses that the parties hereto,for themselvesand their successors,-in consideration 
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af %m premises,of the mutual execution hereof,and of the 
mutual advantages hereby conferred,have covenanted and 
agreed and hereby do covenant and agree,each with the othr 
as follows: 
ARTICLE FIRST. The party of the first part covenants 
and agrees: 
1. (Provisions concerning tank facilities) 
ARTICLE SECOND. The party hereto of the second part 
covenants and agrees: 
1. That the party hereto of the second part will pay and 
allow to the party hereto of the first part,for its own 
use,onall petroleum and its products,transported over the 
railroads of the party hereto of the second part and its 
connections,fpr the party hereto of the first part,rebates 
and on all transported for others drawbacks,at the rates 
hereinafter provided,except in the case specified in Art.3 
2,To deliver to the party hereto of the first part all 
petroleum and its products in packages transported over 
the railroads of the party hereto of the second part and , 
its connections,by'whomsoever shipped,and consigned to 
the party of the first part,at the warehouses of the pat-
ty of the first part,at the seaboard and inland,at the 
depots of the party of the sonrid part,at the places of 
destination,and to deliver all petroleum and its producta 
in bulk owned by or consigned to the said party of the 
first part,at any point required on the line of the rail-
roads of the party of the second part and itd connections. 
3,To transport and deliver petroleum and its products 
over the railroads of the party 6f the second part,and 
its connections,at gross rates,which shall at no time ex-
ceed the -following,without the consent of both parties: 
Prom any point on the Oil Creek and Allegheny River Rail 
road to Oil City,Union,Corry,or Irvineton,which are herein 
designated as common points,on each barrel of 45 gallons 
in bulk and on each barrel of 47 gallons in barrels,30cent 
On crude petroleum. 
From any common point(for each barrel of 45 gallons)to-
Cleveland $0.80 
Pittsburgh .80 
New York 2.56 
Philadelphia . 2.41 
Baltimore 2.40 
Boston 2.71 
All other points,except those on the Oil Creek and 
Allegheny River Railway,to the places of destination last 
named,the same rates as from the common poi&ts. 
On refined oil,benzine,and other products of petroleum. 










New York 2.00 
Philadelphia 1,85 
Baltimre 1.85 
Prom any common point to-
New York 2..92 
Phi lade Iphlec 2.77 
Baltimore 2,77 
Boston 3.07 
Prom and to all points intermediate between the points 
aforsaid such reasonable rates as the party of the second 
part shall from time to time establish on both crude and 
refined. 
4. To pay and to allow the party hereto of the first 
part,on all petroleum and its products,transported for it 
over the railroads of the party of the second part and its 
connections,the following rebates and on all transported 
for other parties drawbacks of like amounts as the rebates 
from the gross rates,the same to be deducted and retained 
by the parto hereto of the firste part for its own use frm 
the amounts of freights payable to the party of the 2 p*crt 
On the transportation of crude petroleum. 
Rebate 
Prom the gross rate from any common point to- per bid 
Cleveland $0.40 
Pittsburgh .40 
New York 1.06 
Phi lade lphia 1.06 
Baltimore 1.06 
Boston 1.06 
Prom the gross rates from all other points than the six 
places of destination last named rebates the same as on 
the rates from the common points. 
On transportation of refined oil,benzine,etc. 
Prom the gross rate from Pittsburgh to-
New York $0.50 
Philadelphia .50 
Baltimore . 50 
Prom the gross rate from Cleveland to-
Boston •50 
New York »50 
Philadelphia .50 
Baltimore .50 
Prom the gross rates from any common point to-




Prom the gross rates to and from all pointa intermediate 
.between the above points a rebate or drawback of one-third 
of the gross rate shall be paid. 
Prom the gross rates from Pittsburgh,Cleveland,and other 
points to places west of the meridians of Pittsburgh and 
Cleveland a rebate or drawback of one- third of the gross rates shall be paid. 
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$• To c h a r g e t o a l l o t h e r p a r t i e s ( e x c e p t i n g such a s a r e 
r e f e r r e d t o i n a r t i c l e 3 ) f o r t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o f p e t r o l e -
um and i t s p r o d u c t s t a t e s u j s h i d b . - ' s h a l l n o t he l e s s than t h e 
g r o s s r a t e s a b o v e s p e c i f i e d , a n d s h o u l d a t any t i m e any l e s 
r a t e be c h a r g e d . d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , e i t h e r by way of 
r e b a t e , c o m m i s s i o n , a l l o w a n c e s , o r upon any p r e t e x t whatsoever 
t h e same r e d u c t i o n p e r b a r r e l s h a l l be made t o t h e p a r t y 
h e r e t o o f t h e f i r s t . p a r t , f r o m t h e n e t r a ' t e s p r o v i d e d f o r 
them,om a l l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f o r them d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d f o r 
w h i c h s u c h r e d u c t i o n s h a l l be made t o o t h e r s . 
6 & Jt(Concerning p r o p o r t i o n o i l f u r n i s h e d & s e r v i c e ) 
8 . To make m a n i f e s t s o r w a y b i l l s o f a l l p e t r o l e u m and 
i t s p r o d u c t s t r a n s p o r t e d o v e r a n y p o r t i o n o f the r a i l r o a d s 
o f t h e p a r t y o f t h e s e c o n d p a r t o r i t s c o n n e c t i o n s , w h i c h 
m a n i f e s t s s h a l l s t a t e t h e name of t h e c o n s i g n o r , t h e p l a c e 
o f s h i p m e n t , t h e k i n d and a c t u a l q u a n t i t y o f t h e a r t i c l e 
s h i p p e d , t h e name o f t h e c o n s i g n e e , a n d t h e p l a c e o f d e s -
t i n a t i o n , w i t h t h e , d a t e and g r o s s amount of f r e i g h t and 
c h a r g e s and t o send d a i l y t o t h e p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e o f the 
p a r t y o f t h e f i r s t p a r t d u p l i c a t e s o f a l l s u c h m a n i f e s t s . 
ARTICLE THIRD.And i t i s h e r e b y f u r t h e r c o v e n a n t e d and a 
a g r e e d b y and between t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o t h a t t h e r e b a t e s 
h e r e i n b e f o r e p r o v i d e d f o r t h e p a r t y h e r e t o o f t h e f i r s t 
p a r t may be made t o a n y o t h e r p a r t y who s h a l l f u r n i s h an 
e q u a l a m o t o t o f t r a n s p o r t a i o n and who s h a l l p o s s e s s the 
w o r k s , m e a n s and f a c i l i t i e s f o r c a r r y i n g on and promoting 
t h e p e t r o l e u m t r a d e e q u a l t o t h o s e p o s s e s s e d and used by 
t h e p a r t y h e r e t o o f t h e f i r s t p a r t . 
ARTICLE FOURTH. And i t i s h e r e b y f u r t h e r c o v e n a n t e d and 
a g r e e d b y and between t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o t h a t t h e p a r t y 
h e r e t o o f t h e second p a r t s h a l l a t a l l t i m e s c o o p e r a t e , a s 
f a r a s i t l e g a l l y m a y , w i t h t h e p a r t y h e r e t o o f t h e second 
p a r t t o m a n t a i n t h e b u s i n e s s o f t h e p a r t y h e r e t o o f the 
f i r s t jia.rt a g a i n s t l o s s o r i n j u r y b y c o m p e t i t i o n , t o the 
end t h a t t h e p a r t y h e r e t o o f the f i r s t p a r t may k e e p up a 
r e m u n e r a t i v e and so a f u l l and r e g u l a r b u s i n e s s , a n d t o 
t h a t end s h a l l l o w e r o r r a i s e t h e g r o s s r a t e s o f t r a n s -
p o r t a t i o n o v e r i t s r a i l r o a d s and c o n n e c t i o n s a s f a r a s i t 
l e g a l l y m a y , f o r such t i m e s and t o s u c h e x t e n t a s may be 
n e c e s s a r y t o overcome s u c h c o m p e t i t i o n , t h e r e b a t e s and 
drawbackd t o t h e p a r t y o f t h e f i r s t p a r t t o be v a r i e d 
p a r i p a s s u w i t h t h e g r e s s r a t e s . 
ARTICLE FIFTH I t i s f u r t h e r m u t u a l l y a g r e e d b y and b e -
t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o t h a t t h i s agreement s h a l l c o n -
t i n u e and remain i n f o r c e f o r a p e r i o d of n o t l e s s than 
f i v e y e a r s and s h a l l n o t t h e n o r t h e r e a f t e r t e r m i n a t e 
u n t i l one o f t h e p a r t i e s s h a l l h a v e g i v e n I S months 
w r i t t e n n o t i c e t o t e r m i n a t e i t . 
( A r t i c l e 5 r e f e r s t o method of c h a n g i n g r a t e s , A r t i c l e 6 
p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e g r o s s r a t e s h a l l be advanced a t the 
w i l l o f t h e f i r s t p a r t y A r t i c l e d t r e a t s o f t h e mode o f 
a r b i t r a t i o n . ) 
S i g n a t u r e s . 
Taken from Commissioner C o r p . P e t r o l e u m I n d . I , p p 3 4 5 - 3 5 0 
4 APPENDIX) - d . 
Petitioner*sExhibit 631,U.S.vs.Standard, 
Price of water-white illuminating oil and margins,o 
onoct,15,1904 "by specified towns throughout U.S. 
(cents per gallon) 
NORTH ATLANTIC STATES. 
m PRICE MARGIN i ^OPCOMPETITION 
Maine 
Portland...... 11.50 2.34 14.00 
New Hampshire 
Concord....... 11.00 2.08 ...... 
Nashua 11.00 2.14 4.7 
Vermont 
Burlington..,. 10.00 1.54 1.0 
Bellows P A H 8 . 10.00 1.14 
Barre... 10.00 0.69 
Mas sachus e 11 s 
Boston 11.00 2.82 11.3 
Brocton....., 11.00 2.18 0 
Fall River.. .1010350 2.15 0 
Lowell ..10.50 1.72 3,2 
Lynn 11.00 ~#.6! £107 
Sprinfield.... 8.00 -0.88 21.7 
Worcester..... 8 .00 0.08 5.00 
Connecticut 
Hartford 9.00 0.18 21.7 
New Haven.... 9.00 a 99 1107 
NewLomdon... lo.OO 1.61 28.9 
New york: 
Albany 10.00 1.56 10.1 
Binghamton... 9.50 1.00 39.1 
Buffalo. lo.OO 2.01 10.4 
Elmira 10.00 1.08 26.8 
New York *l©i98 2.31 8.6 
Syracuse... ..10.00 1.38 10.6 
Yonkers.. 11.00 1.56 7.6 
Pennsylvania 
Altoona 11.00 2.98 0 
Chamber sburg 9.50 1.30 2.8 
Chester ,8.50 0.30 20.9 
Harrisburg 10.50 2,47 xndft. 10.3 
Pittsburg 8,50 o,87 32.8 
REading 9.50 1.32 26.7 
Scranton 9.00 0.82 7.5 Williamsport 10.00 1.63 13.5 New Jersey 
BridgeBon ft 10.00 1.27 ... 
Csmden 9.50 1003 9.9 
Newark \t.00 %.6Q 18.3 
TRenton 9 # 5 0 0 t Q 5 1 2 < 4 
Jersey gity 10.94 2.59 7.5 
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PRICE MARGIJT $CoB*etition 
Maryland and D.O, 
Baltimore 8,50 .09 16.5 
FPederic 10.00 1.70 
Washington 8.50 • 13 
Virginia 
Norfolk 9.50 .68 29.6 
Richmond 8.00 -.27 12.0 
Roanoke 11.50 2,29 . • • • • 
West Virginia 
Charleston 10.00 2.56 0 
Wheeling 9.50 1,66 12.2 
North Carolina 
Wilmington 11.00 1.99 1.1 
Raleigh IS .00 1.56 » * f 
8outh Carolina 
Columbia 13.00 2.27 0 
Georgia 
Atlanta 13.00 1.98 0 
Savannah 18.50 2.48 1.7 
Florida ' 
Jacksonville 13.00 3.10 3.9 
Tampa 14.50 3«93 
NORTH CENTRAL 8TATES. 
Ohio 
Cincinnati 7.00 -1.09 45.3 
Cleveland 7.00 .16 11.7 
Columbus 9.50 1.72 2.3 
Indiana 
• Evansville 9.00 .05 29.0 
Indianapolis 8.50 .IS 22,0 
8ouih Bend 10.00 1.90 0 
Illinois 
Chicago 8,50 .56 12.7 
Decatur 9,50 .08 12.9 
Joliet 9.00 .73 18.5 
Michigan 
Detroit 8.50 .24 17.6 
Calumet 12.25 2.40 .... 
Grand Rapids 9.50 1.14 .... 
Wisconson 
La Crosse 9.00 .17 38.6 
Milwaukee 8.50 .65 38.6 
Eau Claire 10.75 1.14 .... 
Minnesota 
Duluth 8.50 -.88 9.9 
Minneapolis 9.50 .24 41.8 
Maakato 11.50 2.34 0 
1 0 WClinton 10.00 .17 
Cedar Palls 12.25 2.10 .... 
Dee Moines 10.75 .53 41.8 
Price of water-white and. illuminating oil,inu*.8.~cont. 
(cent* par gallon) 
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NORTH CENTRAL C o n t . 
! ' i s no - r*i PRICE MARGIN COMPETITION 
M i s s o u r i 
£ 4 . 2 K a n s a s C i t y 1 0 . 0 0 . 2 ? 
8 t . Joseph. 1 1 . 0 0 1 . 5 2 0 
K a n s a s 
L e a v e n w o r t h 1 0 . 5 0 . 4 8 0 3 . . 
P o r t 8 c o t t 1 2 . 0 0 1 . 9 8 
W i c h i t a 1 0 . 0 0 . 4 8 3 2 . 1 
N e b r a s k a 
t • 4 1 2 1 . 7 Omaha 1 0 . 0 0 
H a s t i n g s 1 3 . 0 0 1 • 4tS ,v» e. •' 
F r e m o n t 1 2 . 0 0 1 • *~ »'*• • • « 
N o r t h D a k o t a 
2 . 1 0 0 l a r g o 1 3 . 5 0 
S o u t h D a k o t a 2.27 Huron 1 4 , 5 0 • • • 
8 i o u x P a l l s 1 2 . 0 0 . 3 5 OQ. 
WE8S?ERN STATES 
M o n t a n a 
B u t t e 
Wyoming 
C h e y e n n e 
C o l o r a d o 
D e n v e r 
L e a d v i l l e 
New M e x i c o 
A l b u q u e r q u e 
U t a h 
S a l t L a k e C i t y 
W a s h i n g t o n 
S e a t t l e 
S p o k a n e 
O r e g o n 
P o r t l a n d 
C a l i f o r n i a 
L o s A n g e l o s 
O a k l a n d 
S a c r a m e n t o 
8an F r a n c i s c o 
2 3 , 0 0 5 . 7 6 0 . 8 
1 8 . 0 0 4 . 3 2 0 . 6 
1 6 . 0 0 
2 0 . 0 0 
3»39 
5 . 4 7 
0 
0 
2 3 . 0 0 6 . 4 8 7 . 0 
• 2 0 . 0 0 4 . 0 9 09 
1 5 . 5 
2 1 . 5 0 
4 . 1 7 
4 . 1 2 
0 
0 
1 5 . 0 0 4 . 1 2 0 
7 . 5 0 
1 2 . 5 0 
1 3 . 0 0 
1 2 . 0 0 
- 3 . 1 6 
£ . 4 6 
2 . 4 5 
1 . 7 3 
3 3 . 4 
0 . 3 
0 
7 . 1 
T a k e n f r o m 8 t e v e n s , I n d u s t r i a l C o m b i n a t i o n s 
And T r u s t s , p p . 3 3 5 - 3 3 9 . 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y . 
A m e r i c a n E c o n o m i c A s s o c i a t i o n , P u b l i c a t i o n s . 
A p r i l , 1 9 1 3 . 
A n n a l s o f ths A m s r i c a n A c a d e m y o f P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l 
S c i e n c e , A X K X X K X J u l y 1 9 1 3 
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